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Collective bargaining in a democratic society rests on freedom of 
association which enables workers (and employers) to form organiza- 
tions to represent their interests. Although commonly asserted by the 
organization, freedom of association is not simply a collective right 
vested in the organization for its benefit. Freedom of association is an 
individual right vested in the individual to enable him to enlarge his 
personal freedom. Its function is not merely to grant power to groups, 
but to enrich the individual's participation in the democratic process 
by his acting through those groups. 
From the standpoint of individual rights and the democratic func- 
tion of collective bargaining, freedom of association contains three 
distinct elements or forms of freedom. First is the freedom to 
organize-the right of individuals to join together to choose a single 
spokesman and to combine conomic resources for their common good. 
This is the threshold right, for only through organizing can the indi- 
vidual in a collectivized industrial system participate meaningfully in 
the decisions which vitally affect his economic welfare. Second is 
the freedom to choose between organizations-the right of the indi- 
vidual to join and work through the organization which he believes 
speaks best for his needs and desires. This freedom of choice helps 
fulfill the purpose of the right to organize, for it enables the individual 
to give voice more clearly to his own wishes. By choosing between 
organizations, he participates in deciding which goals shall be sought 
and influences the decisions which affect him. Third is the freedom 
not to join any organization-the right of the individual to refuse to 
participate in collective action and to insist on acting alone. 
These are three distinct freedoms, each subject to varying 
measures of protection and recognition in a collective bargaining 
system. More importantly, these three freedoms are not always 
mutually reinforcing; the strengthening of one may be at the expense 
t Professor of Law, Yale University. B.S. 1939, J.D. 1942, University of Illinois; 
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of another. For example, the freedom of workers to organize 
fulfills its function only to the extent that the union can be effective in 
collective bargaining, but the freedom to choose between organizations 
requires rival unions which may fragment the workers' economic power 
in the babble of competing spokesmen. Similarly, the freedom not to 
join dilutes the freedom to organize by reducing the effectiveness of 
collective action. The clash between these freedoms is commonly ex- 
pressed as a conflict between the union and the individual, but in a 
deeper sense it is a conflict between individual rights. 
Sweden and the United States have both struggled with the prob- 
lem of reconciling these competing claims, for in both countries col- 
lective bargaining rests broadly on freedom of association. Both 
countries view collective bargaining as more than a method of regulat- 
ing the labor market; they each view it as a way of bringing a measure 
of democracy to industrial life. Both countries assert the worth of the 
individual and declare that the function of collective bargaining is to 
enlarge his freedom. In spite of these common premises and com- 
parable systems of collective bargaining, the scope and content given 
to freedom of association in the two countries are significantly different. 
The difference is reflected both in the relative weights given to each 
of the three constituent freedoms and in the efforts made to reconcile 
or adjust their conflicting claims. 
Both countries have confronted the problem in its boldest form. 
They approve "union security" or "organization" clauses in collective 
agreements, thereby requiring an individual to join or support the 
union as a condition of employment. Although both have placed legal 
limits on such provisions, the limits have not been the same. The 
cases which have arisen under these provisions emphasize the inherent 
difficulty of the problem and help reveal the relative weights given to 
the constituent freedoms. 
By comparing freedom of association in two countries such as 
Sweden and the United States we may gain a clearer perspective of 
that freedom in both countries. The very similarity of democratic 
ideals and collective bargaining systems helps cast the special contours 
of that freedom in each country. It also makes us sharply aware of 
the different content which such a basic value may be given in demo- 
cratic societies. Any meaningful comparison is difficult, for our 
concern is not with legal definitions but with social realities. The 
freedom actually enjoyed depends not only on the legal protection 
provided, but also on the recognition given these rights in practice by 
the parties. 
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I. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
A. The Freedom To Organize 
1. Legal Protection 
Freedom of association is a constitutionally protected right in 
both Sweden and the United States,l and this guarantee is commonly 
considered to include the right of workers to form unions for collective 
bargaining.2 The constitutional provisions, however, have limited 
significance, for they protect only against governmental cts, while the 
principal restraints on the right to organize have been imposed by 
employers. Protection must therefore rest either on the union's own 
economic strength or in legislation securing this right against private 
action. 
Legislation protecting the right to organize has been enacted in 
both countries. Congress, in enacting the National Labor Relations 
Act in 1935, stated that right in broadest erms. Section 7 provides: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage 
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection .. .. 
The Swedish Right of Association and Negotiation Act,4 enacted the 
following year, stated the right more abruptly: "The right of asso- 
ciation shall not be infringed . ."5 The right was not defined 
1 Sweden has no explicit provision equivalent o that in the first amendment that 
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble . . . ."; but the right of association has generally been read into the 
general provisions of Article 16 of the Instrument of Government. See ROBBINS, 
THE GOVERNMENT OF LABOR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN, 278 (1942). For discussions 
of this right in the United States, see Abernathy, The Right of Association, 6 
S.C.L.Q. 32 (1953); Wyzanski, The Open Window and the Open Door: An Inquiry 
Into Freedom of Association, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 336 (1947). 
2 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); AFL v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 
90, 155 P.2d 145 (1944); Betankande med F6rslag till Lag om Forenings-och 
F6rhandlingsratt, SOU 1935:59, at 53, 103. 
Citations in this Article to Swedish publications employ the abbreviations et 
forth in SCHMIDT, THE LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 233 (1962) [herein- 
after cited as SCHMIDT, LABOUR]. AD indicates Arbetsdomstolens domar (the 
Swedish Labor Court Decisions); SOU indicates Statens offentliga utredningar (com- 
mand papers); N.J.A. is Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv (the Swedish Supreme Court 
Reports). 
349 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. ? 157 (1958). The economic and 
political antecedents of this statute are traced in BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COL- 
LECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY (1950). 
4 Svensk F6rfattningssamling, 1936 nr. 506, translated in SCHMIDT, LABOUR 
251-58. 
5 SCHMIDT, LABOUR 251. 
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because the Riksdag could not agree on a definition,6 and the Labor 
Court was compelled to give it specific content through judicial de- 
cisions.7 In 1940 the right was legislatively defined as, "the right of 
employers and employees to belong to an association . .. , to exercise 
their rights as members . . . , and to work for an association or for 
the formation of an association." 8 Although the right to organize is 
expressed in similar statutory terms in both countries, the legal pro- 
tection in the two countries is significantly different. The right to 
organize in Sweden is in legal theory rooted in the individual, and the 
organization has no independently protected legal right.9 Employer 
tactics directed at undermining and destroying the union are not 
prohibited unless they also violate an employee's individual right to 
freedom of association.'0 The union's right to damages is derivative 
only, and depends upon a showing of wrong to an individual." In 
the United States the right is both individual and collective. Although 
the statute protects the individual, it gives the union independent pro- 
tection. In practice, the protection is primarily collective, and in 
refusal to bargain cases it is solely collective. 
The range of employer conduct prohibited is also much narrower 
in Sweden than in the United States. For example, a Swedish em- 
ployer, unlike his American counterpart, can post watch over union 
meetings, plant spies inside the union, grant unilateral increases, or 
make individual contracts with employees in order to discourage union 
organization. There are no Swedish cases limiting the employer in 
what he can say to his employees concerning unionization, or in what 
he can ask them concerning union membership.l2 Nor are there any 
cases holding that employees have a right to distribute union pamphlets 
and solicit union membership in the plant and in the parking lot on 
The legislative debates are traced in Betankande med F6rslag till Andring i 
Lagen om Forenings-och F6rhandlingsratt, SOU 1939:49, at 16-25. 
7 See AD 1937:73. 
8 Svensk F6rfattningssamling, 1940 nr. 332, in SCHMIDT, LABOUR 251. 
9 Section 3 of the Right of Association Act defines violations as "measures . . . 
to constrain any employee or employer, as the case may be . . ." See AD 
1946:68 (violation by a union of an employer's right of association). 
10 See generally SCHMIDT, LABOUR 129, 136. 
11 SOU 1939:49, supra note 6, at 71. The individual whose rights are violated, 
however, need not be a member of the union but may be one outside the union who 
is induced not to join. 
12 Threats made to specific employees to discharge them if they join the union 
can be a violation of the statute, see SCHMIDT, LABOUR 175, but the Labor Court has 
been willing to overlook such threats on the ground that they were made in the heat 
of the moment and not seriously meant, AD 1953:30. The employer can declare 
his dissatisfaction with the employees' joining the union, AD 1953:19, tell them that 
if they do not join another union with lower wages he may have a layoff, AD 
1945:92, urge them to join the competing union, AD 1943:95, or question them as 
to their union membership, AD 1939:68. 
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nonworking time.13 Favored unions may be assisted or employer- 
controlled unions created, since Swedish law has no provision parallel 
to section 8(a) (2) prohibiting employers from dominating or inter- 
fering with the formation or administration of unions. 
The protection of the Swedish statute does not reach much beyond 
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act-protection 
against discrimination in employment designed to interfere with the 
employee's freedom of association.14 Although the kinds of employer 
conduct prohibited 5 and the legal rules developed'6 in Sweden are 
similar to those in the United States, the protection actually provided 
against discrimination is not the same. For example, a Swedish truck 
driver who joined the union and then insisted on being paid according 
to the collective agreement was denied relief when he was discharged. 
The Swedish Labor Court conceded that his exercise of statutory 
rights was the immediate cause of his discharge, but held that since he 
was slow, clumsy, and in some degree dull-witted, the employer was 
entitled to replace him with a competent worker if he were to claim 
the union scale.7 In contrast, an American truck driver who was an 
active union leader was discharged after he was found taking gasoline 
from his truck. The NLRB found that the discharge was motivated 
in part by his union activities and ordered him reinstated with back 
pay.'8 In another Swedish case, an employer paid lower wages to 
members of one of two competing unions and told them they could not 
be paid more until they joined the other union. The Swedish Labor 
Court found no violation on the ground that the employer did not do 
this for the purpose of causing them to leave their union, even though 
13 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); cf. United Steel- 
workers v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 357 (1958); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 
105 (1956). 
14 From 1929 to 1956 there were 185 cases brought o the Labor Court claiming 
employer violation of the right of association. Of these, 160 were cases of dismissal, and the rest involved claims of lesser forms of discrimination. GEIJER & SCHMIDT, 
ARBETAGIVARE OCH FACKFORENINGSLEDARE I DOMARSATE 43 (1958). 
15 For example, it is a violation for an employer to discriminate against union 
members by paying them lower wages, AD 1936:78, denying them promotions, AD 
1955:16, transfering them to less desirable work, AD 1953:39, giving them less over- 
time work, AD 1948:52, or giving them a bad letter of recommendation, AD 1953:36. 
It is also a violation to require an employee to agree not to join a union, AD 1951:46, 
to offer an increase on condition that the employee leave the union, AD 1958:35, 
or to state in a work certificate that he is a union member when this may interfere 
with getting another job, AD 1936:78. 
16 The statutes in both countries require an objective element. In the United 
States there must be an "act of discrimination," and in Sweden a "measure." Both 
statutes also require a subjective element of intention or motive to interfere with 
the freedom of association. 
17 AD 1943:116; see AD 1953:30. 
18 NLRB v. Ford, 170 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1948); see Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. 
v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1943). 
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it had that effect."9 In a similar case, the United States Supreme Court 
found an employer guilty of an unfair labor practice for paying greater 
benefits to union members than to nonunion employees.2 The Court 
declared that he was deemed to intend the foreseeable consequences of 
his conduct and the natural consequences of his conduct were to en- 
courage or discourage membership in the union. Thus, although the 
employer's motive is crucial in both countries, the kind of motive re- 
quired and the evidence necessary to prove that motive is quite dif- 
ferent.21 The employer's conduct is more strictly circumscribed and 
more closely scrutinized by the NLRB than by the Swedish Labor 
Court. 
Another difference can be found in Sweden's failure to protect 
those seeking employment. The employer can refuse to hire job appli- 
cants because of their union membership, since the individual's right 
of association is said to depend on the employment relation.22 The 
union has no legal recourse ven though the employer's ystematic dis- 
crimination in hiring undermines or destroys it, for its rights are only 
derivative and discrimination i  hiring does not constitute a violation 
of the individual's right.23 In the United States, the job seeker is 
entitled to the same protection as the job holder. It is as much a vio- 
lation for an employer to discriminate because of union membership 
in hiring as in discharging. In the words of the Supreme Court: 
Discrimination against union labor in the hiring of men is a 
dam to self-organization at the source of supply. The effect of 
such discrimination is not confined to the actual denial of em- 
ployment; it inevitably operates against the whole idea of 
legitimacy of organization.24 
In Sweden, the employer's right to organize is considered the 
equivalent of the employee's right and is protected in the same statu- 
tory terms. In a leading case, the union refused to contract with a 
small employers' association which was not affiliated with the Swedish 
Employers' Federation (SAF), and insisted that the employers in- 
volved sign individual contracts. To avoid a threatened strike, the 
employers joined an association which was affiliated with SAF and 
with which the union had an agreement. The Labor Court held that 
the union, by refusing to contract with the unaffiliated organization, 
19AD 1942:72. 
20 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). 
21 See cases cited note 12 supra. 
22 See ScHMIDT, LABOUR 134; SOU 1939:49, supra note 6, at 70. 
2 SCHMIDT, LABOUR 136; SOU 1939:49, supra note 6, at 71-72. 
24 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185 (1941). 
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had violated the employers' freedom of association, since one of the 
principal benefits of this freedom was having the association as a party 
to collective agreements.25 The Wagner Act, in contrast, does not 
even mention the right of employers to organize, and the Taft-Hartley 
Act contains only the isolated provision that it is an unfair labor prac- 
tice for a union "to restrain or coerce . . . an employer in the selec- 
tion of his representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
the adjustment of grievances . . . 2 It is not clear to what 
extent, if any, this protects the right of employers to join together 
for mutual aid and protection.27 There is clearly no common acceptance 
that the employer's right is the full equivalent of the employee's right. 
2. De Facto Protection 
Except for the explicit protection given employers, legal protection 
of the right to organize is much narrower in Sweden than in the United 
States. A bare comparison of legal rules, however, fails to measure 
the extent to which that right is in fact recognized and enjoyed in the 
two countries. 
Swedish employers at first bitterly resisted unionization. Union 
members were discharged and evicted from company-owned houses; 
employees were required to sign "yellow dog" contracts in which they 
agreed not to join a union. The employers also refused to recognize 
or deal with unions, and formed "company" or "yellow" unions which 
they controlled.28 However, with the rise of centralized employers' 
associations at the turn of the century, particularly the Swedish Em- 
ployers' Federation (SAF), the prevailing attitude changed.29 Em- 
ployers who organized felt compelled to recognize an equivalent right 
of workers to organize,30 and the basic assumption of the employers' 
25 AD 1946:68. 
26 Labor-Management Relations Act ? 8(b)(1), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
?158(b)(1) (1958). 
27 See NLRB v. Local 499, Teamsters Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) (under cer- 
tain circumstances, employers may engage in concerted economic action of lockout); 
Metropolitan Dist. Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters, 137 N.L.R.B. 1583 (1962) 
(union may not compel an employer to accept an association as his representative); 
United Ass'n of Journeymen of Plumbing Indus., 135 N.L.R.B. 462 (1962) (union 
may not compel members of one association to be represented by another associa- 
tion); Hoisting & Portable Eng'r Union, 132 N.L.R.B. 648 (1961) (union may 
refuse to bargain with association as multiemployer representative); General Team- 
sters Union, 127 N.L.R.B. 488 (1960) (union may not refuse to bargain with asso- 
ciation and insist on individual contracts) ; Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New 
Shadows on an Old Terrain, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 614 (1961). 
28 ADLERCREUTZ, KOLLEKTIVAVTALET 230-35 (1954); ROBBINS, THE GOVERNMENT 
OF LABOR RELATIONS 70 (1942). 
29 ADLERCREUTZ, op. cit. supra note 28, at 242-43. 
30 HALLENDORFF, SVENSKA ARBETSGIVAREF6RENINGEN 1902-27, at 12, 16, 50 
(1927). 
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associations was that labor must be dealt with collectively through 
workers' organizations.31 Thus, when the SAF learned that a labor 
conflict involving one of its members had been caused by the employer's 
refusal to allow his employees to join the union, it refused to give the 
employer any financial aid or other support.32 
In 1906 a number of bitter and prolonged strikes growing out of 
the union's efforts to prevent the employment of nonunion workers 
led to the negotiation of the famous "December Compromise" between 
the Swedish Employers' Federation and the Confederation of Swedish 
Trade Unions.33 This agreement declared that, "The right of asso- 
ciation shall be left inviolate on both sides." It further provided that, 
"If the workers believe that discharge has occurred under circum- 
stances which may be interpreted as an attack on their right of asso- 
ciation, they may, before further steps are taken, through their organ- 
ization call for an investigation for vindication of their rights."34 
Thereafter, provisions guaranteeing these rights were commonly in- 
cluded in collective agreements, and the great majority of employers 
recognized the right of workers to organize. With the enactment of 
the Collective Contracts Act of 1928, provisions in collective agree- 
ments guaranteeing freedom of association became legally enforce- 
able.35 Even in the absence of an explicit contractual provision, the 
Labor Court held that such a provision must be implied because the 
employer's obligation to respect the right of association was inherent 
in the legal nature of the collective agreement.3 
By 1936 nearly 90 percent of all manual workers were unionized 
and covered by collective agreements. They therefore enjoyed prac- 
tical recognition and legal protection of the right to organize.37 The 
Right of Association Act of 1936 simply extended legal protection to 
employees not covered by collective agreements-primarily agricul- 
tural workers, clerical workers, and salaried employees. Since the 
passage of the statute, most Swedish employers have fully accepted the 
right of association. Violations of the statute are now quite rare, with 
31 Id. at 31, 41. 
32 Id. at 74. 
33 Id. at 75-84; ADLERCREUTZ, op. cit. supra note 28, at 344-48. 
34 Whether this last provision gave the union only the right to call for an inves- 
tigation or gave it the right to call for negotiations, leading eventually to arbitration 
was unclear and led to conflicting views by the parties. See SCHMIDT 126; 
ADLERCREUTZ, op. cit. supra note 28, at 347-50. 
35 See, e.g., AD 1931:107 (discharge for organizing activity); AD 1933:30 
(requiring employees to sign "yellow dog" contracts). The cases are collected in 
SOU 1939:49, supra note 6, at 48-62, and ROBBINS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 287-305. 
36 AD 1935:57; AD 1935:94; GIEJER & SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 14, at 35-36. 
37 See Betankande med F6rslag till Lag om F6renings-och F6rhandlingsritt, 
SOU 1935:59, at 74-103. 
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only four or five cases being brought to the Labor Court each year. 
Nearly 95 percent of all manual workers and 80 percent of all salaried 
employees are now unionized. Thus, the right to organize is in fact 
fully recognized and enjoyed. 
The right to organize in the United States is in fact far less com- 
plete. Historically, American employers combated unionization with 
all of the methods used at first by Swedish employers, but instead of 
abandoning these tactics, American employers refined and reinforced 
them. Employers' associations were not organized to deal with unions, 
but to destroy them;38 union leaders were discharged and blacklisted; 
and "company unions" were systematically promoted as a part of the 
"American plan." 39 In this contest over unionization, the courts often 
curbed the unions' counter measures.40 Strikes to compel reinstatement 
of discharged union leaders were declared illegal; 41 union efforts to per- 
suade employees who had signed "yellow dog" contracts to join the 
union were enjoined; 42 and picketing, no matter how peaceful, was 
denominated coercive and prohibited.43 In 1935, when the National 
Labor Relations Act was passed, only 13 percent of all nonagricultural 
employees were union members.44 This act was not, like its Swedish 
counterpart, the statutory declaration of a generally recognized right 
to organize; instead it was an attempt legally to establish and protect 
a right commonly denied. However, employer esistance to unioniza- 
tion did not end with the passage of the act. Even today, many 
38 See generally BONNETT, EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1922). Prior to 1900, employer associations willing to negotiate with unions pre- 
dominated, but hostile associations subsequently became more prevalent. Even the 
National Metal Trades Association, the most militant antiunion organization, began 
as a negotiating association but became distinctly belligerent in 1901. Id. at 24. 
39 For a brief description of employer antiunion tactics see BERNSTEIN, THE 
LEAN YEARS 144-89 (1960); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, LABOR AND GOVERNMENT 
51-64 (1935). For more extended descriptions see HUBERMAN, THE LABOR SPY 
RACKET (1937); LEVINSON, I BREAK STRIKES (1934). Such activities in the 1930's 
were extensively explored by the La Follette Committee. See Senate Comm. on 
Education and Labor, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, S. REP. No. 46, 
75th Cong. 1st Sess. (1937). 
40 See generally FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1-46 (1930); 
WITTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES 12-60 (1932); Magruder, A Half 
Century of Legal Influence Upon Development of Collective Bargaining, 50 HARV. 
L. REV. 1071 (1937). In contrast, the courts in Sweden were almost totally neutral, 
limiting neither the union's nor the employer's use of economic force in disputes 
over organization or terms of agreement. ADLERCREUTZ, op. cit. supra note 28, at 
227-31. 
41 See, e.g., Mechanics Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Lynch, 236 Mass. 504, 128 
N.E. 877 (1920). 
42 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); UMWA v. Red 
Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927). 
43 See, e.g., Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1905); 
Keith Theatre v. Vachon, 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692 (1936); Cooper, The Fiction of 
Peaceful Picketing, 35 MICH. L. REv. 73 (1936). 
44 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 
98 (1962). 
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employers use every method within the letter of the law to prevent 
unionization or to undermine existing unions.45 Various business or- 
ganizations distribute publications advising employers how to frustrate 
union organizing efforts; 46 certain lawyers become specialists in help- 
ing employers combat the union and defeat it in an election; and "labor 
consultants" may provide the employer with a captive union.47 In fact, 
some employers are willing to use antiunion devices that are not within 
the limits of the law, and will commit even the most flagrant violations 
rather than tolerate a union. The NLRB during its last fiscal year 
issued 1,102 complaints of unfair labor practices against employers, and 
an equal number of charges were settled prior to the issuing of the 
complaint.48 In 1962, 3,351 employees who had been discriminatorily 
discharged were offered reinstatement intheir jobs and employers were 
required to pay a total of nearly two and a half million dollars in back 
pay.49 It is evident that in many shops and communities a worker 
joins a union at his peril. 
Legal protection of the right to join a union is much broader and 
more comprehensive in the United States than in Sweden, but the 
scope of legal protection is more a product of the lack of the right to 
organize than a measure of its actual existence. The law has curbed, 
but has not overcome employer esistance; the individual's freedom of 
association, so far as it involves the right to join a union, is in fact 
much greater in Sweden than in the United States. 
B. The Freedom To Choose Between Organizations 
The law of both countries recognizes that the freedom of associa- 
tion includes the freedom to choose between organizations. Section 7 
of the National Labor Relations Act states that, "Employees shall have 
the right . . . to bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing." Section 3 of the Swedish Right of Association 
Act provides that it is a violation of the individual's right of association 
"to cause him not to enter or to leave an association or not to make 
full use of membership . ." Under both statutes it is as much a 
45 See BARKIN, THE DECLINE OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT AND WHAT CAN 
BE DONE ABOUT IT 75 (1961); Wyle, Union Organization Activity Under Taft- 
Hartley, in N.Y.U. 11TH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 191 (1958). 
46 See, e.g., GEORGIA STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE- 
A PRESCRIPTION FOR MANAGEMENT TO USE IN TREATING UNIONITIS (1959); Ten 
Specific Steps Designed To Block Mill Unionization, American Textile Reporter, 
May 19, 1960, p. 75. 
47 See S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 255-300 (1958). 
48 NLRB General Counsel, Summary of Operations 21 (1962). 
49 NLRB General Counsel, Press Release, Jan. 6, 1963. 
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violation for an employer to favor the members of one union over 
members of another as it is to favor nonunion employees. 
The individual does not, however, have complete freedom of choice 
in either country. In the United States, freedom of choice is qualified 
by the principle which makes the union selected by the majority of the 
employees in the bargaining unit the exclusive representative of all 
employees in the unit.50 Once a majority union is designated, the 
individual's freedom of choice is suspended.5' He can, of course, re- 
main a member of another union, but it is hollow membership. The 
other union cannot bargain or contract for him, nor can it handle his 
grievances or consult with his employer.52 He is compelled to accept 
the majority union as his sole representative, and he is bound by its 
collective agreements.53 
Within the framework of majority rule, freedom of choice is a 
guiding principle, and the law is shaped to protect that right. Ma- 
jority status is often determined by a secret ballot, and the National 
Labor Relations Board enforces "strict standards designed to assure 
that participating employees have an opportunity to register a free 
and untrammelled choice . . . 54 Coercive conduct, an atmosphere 
of fear, even material misstatements or "campaign trickery" may so 
impair the reality of freedom of choice as to void the election.' Al- 
though the employer may state his preferences between unions, he can 
give no advantages to one during the campaign nor indicate that he 
will deal with them differently in making a contract.56 After the 
election, freedom of choice is only temporarily suspended, for the losing 
union may obtain a new election when the collective agreement expires, 
50 Section 9(a) provides: "Representatives designated or selected for the pur- 
poses of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate 
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such 
unit for purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of 
employment, or other conditions of employment." 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended 
29 U.S.C. ? 159(a) (1958). 
51 Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 556 
(1945). 
52 Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945). 
53 Comparison of Swedish and American law on this point is discussed more 
fully in Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agree- 
ment-A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963). 
5426 NLRB ANN. REP. 70 (1961); see Funke, Board Regulation of Pre-Election 
Conduct, 36 TEXAS L. REV. 893 (1958). 
5526 NLRB ANN. REP. 72-74 (1961); NLRB v. Trancoa Chem. Corp., 303 F.2d 
456 (1st Cir. 1962). The election may be invalidated even though the employer's 
conduct is not an unfair labor practice but is privileged as "free speech" under sec- 
tion 8(c). General Shoe Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948); Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 
N.L.R.B. 12 (1962). 
56 Checker Taxi Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 611 (1961); Lenscraft Optical Corp., 128 
N.L.R.B. 807 (1960). 
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or has been in force for three years, whichever occurs sooner.57 The 
principle of freedom of choice further influences the Board in limiting 
the size of the bargaining or election unit. The statute requires that 
professional employees be placed in a separate unit and entitles them to 
be represented by their own union unless they vote to be represented 
by the same union as the nonprofessional employees.58 The Board has 
given skilled craft employees substantial freedom to be represented 
separately by traditional craft unions, and has also allowed various 
departmental and other groups of employees within a plant to vote 
separately to designate representatives of their own choosing lest they 
be submerged in a larger bargaining unit.59 Even though an employer 
has several plants doing similar work, the employees in each plant are 
frequently allowed to choose separate bargaining representatives.60 
Multiple mployer units are established only when the employees of 
each employer have chosen a common union.61 The effect of creating 
separate units or election districts i to increase the ability of small 
groups to choose their own representative and thereby reduce the im- 
pact of majority rule on the basic right of freedom of choice. 
The justification for applying majority rule, with its inevitable 
limitation on freedom of association, is simply that experience has 
demonstrated that without such a rule the right to organize would be 
of little value. Bitter rival unionism, particularly when aggravated 
and exploited by employers, frustrated collective bargaining and left 
unions impotent. Only by designating one union as sole spokesman 
could collective bargaining be established and the right to organize 
made meaningful.62 The various legal rules concerning the frequency 
of elections, the size of the bargaining units, and other details repre- 
sent an uneasy balance between freedom of choice and the practical 
needs of collective bargaining. 
Swedish legal theory preserves in purer form the principle of 
free choice. The law of collective agreements reflects he individual- 
istic concept of contract law that a man cannot be bound without his 
5726 NLRB ANN. REP. 39-51 (1961). The Board has recently lengthened the 
contract bar rule from two years to three years. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 
1123 (1962). 
58NLRA ?9(b), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 159(b) (1958). The same section also requires that plant guards must be placed in separate units 
and that no union be certified as the representative of the guards if it admits to 
membership, or is affiliated with, an organization which admits to membership 
employees other than guards. 
59 See 26 NLRB ANN. REP. 54-65 (1961). 
60 See Daykin, Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Units by the NLRB: 
Principles, Rules and Policies, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 218 (1958). 
61 See Summers, supra note 53, at 430. 
2 Houde Engineering Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. (old) 35 (1934). 
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consent. The individual consents to the collective agreement when he 
joins the union.63 A union, therefore, can bargain only for its mem- 
bers, and the collective agreement is legally binding only on the union 
members.64 Each union in a plant can make a separate agreement 
which governs its own members. The individual thus has full freedom 
to bargain through the representative of his own choosing. 
This legal theory, however, does not in practice bar one union from 
effectively prescribing terms and conditions of employment for mem- 
bers of another union. One union may provide in its collective agree- 
ment that the employer shall apply the same terms to all employees 
regardless of union membership. Such a provision is valid, and any 
violation by the employer makes him liable to the contracting union.65 
Because members of another union are not considered parties to this 
contract, they remain legally free to bargain through their own union 
and make a different agreement which is equally binding on the em- 
ployer.66 If the two collective agreements conflict, the presence of one 
does not excuse violation of the other; and the employer cannot escape 
liability in damages to one or the other of the unions.67 This preserves 
the theory of freedom of contract but not its reality, for no employer 
will straddle the legal sword of inconsistent contracts. In practice, the 
weaker union is compelled to conform to the contract of the stronger; 
the employee's freedom is merely to choose the scrivener of the con- 
tract.68 It has never even been suggested that the attempt of one 
union thus to regulate the terms and conditions of employment of mem- 
bers of another union was an invasion of their right to bargain through 
representation of their own choosing. On the contrary, the Labor 
Court has held that even without such a provision there is an implied 
obligation on the employer to give all employees the benefits provided 
in the collective agreement.69 
These legal rules, which give one union effective control and limit 
the individual's freedom to choose his bargaining representative, have 
their roots in economic realities. Even if a union's collective agreement 
could not legally regulate beyond the union's own membership, it 
would in fact do so. To pay different rates and give varying benefits 
to employees working side by side in the same plant would create not 
63 See ADLERCREUTZ, op. cit. supra note 28, at 5; SCHMIDT, TJANSTEAVTALET 31, 
59 (1959). 
64 BERGSTR6M, KOLLEKTIVAVTALSLAGEN 70 (1948); SCHMIDT, LABOUR 112. 
65 SCHMIDT, TJANSTEAVTALET 41 (1959). 
66 AD 1939:24. 
67 AD 1939:24; AD 1937:149. 
68 See, Summers, supra note 53, at 427-31. 
9 AD 1931:93; AD 1932:95; AD 1944:37; AD 1952:8. 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 14 Mar 2013 09:07:49 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
660 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:647 
only administrative confusion in management but also disruptive 
tensions in the work group. Efficient production and employee satis- 
faction require standardization of terms and conditions of employment. 
One union must inevitably dominate, and one agreement must establish 
the controlling terms.70 The United States and Sweden have both 
arrived at this result-one directly by making the majority union the 
exclusive representative, the other indirectly by allowing a union to 
make a contract applicable to nonmembers. The critical difference is
the way in which the controlling union is determined. Instead of 
allowing the workers to determine their bargaining representative by 
a majority vote in a closely supervised election, Sweden permits effec- 
tive representation to depend on the relative economic strength of the 
competing unions, weighted by the employer's preference among 
unions.71 The structure of bargaining in Sweden magnifies this differ- 
ence. Few employers attempt to bargain alone, but instead bargain 
through employers' associations, organized typically along industry 
lines on a national basis.72 These associations negotiate national agree- 
ments for each industry with the parallel national unions of the Swed- 
ish Confederation of Labor (LO).73 Thus, in practice, the bargaining 
units are nationwide and other unions cannot effectively challenge them 
on the national level. Furthermore, the employers' associations have 
historically favored bargaining with the unions affiliated with the two 
major federations and have resisted bargaining with competing 
unions.74 If a competing union at the local level insists that a par- 
ticular employer deviate from the national agreement, it will be con- 
fronted by the massed economic resources of the employers' association. 
Even though all of the employees of the particular employer join the 
competing union, the employers' association will generally refuse to 
sanction any agreement which varies from the national agreement 
negotiated with the affiliated unions. Thus, workers employed by a 
70 Several unions may bargain jointly through a committee or cooperate in other 
ways in negotiating for an enterprise or industry, but each union is the spokesman for 
its particular category of employees, and the terms for those employees are 
standardized. 
71 The contrast is emphasized by the Supreme Court decision in International 
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961), which held that it 
was an unfair labor practice for an employer to recognize a union as the representa- 
tive of his employees when it in fact did not have a majority, even though both the 
employer and the union mistakenly believed it had a majority. The contract made 
with the union was held unlawful and the employer was ordered to withdraw recog- 
nition until after the Board held an election. 
72 SWEDISH EMPLOYERS CONFEDERATION, PERSPECTIVE OF LABOR CONDITIONS IN 
SWEDEN (1962). 
73 LO negotiates for manual workers, and the national unions of the Salaried 
Employees Central Organization (TCO) negotiates for white collar workers. The 
structure of bargaining is described in JOHNSTON, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SWEDEN 
(1962). 
74 See Summers upra note 53, at 428-29. 
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member of an employers' association have no practical freedom to 
choose which union shall negotiate the controlling agreement. They 
are in fact governed by the LO and TCO regardless of their choice. 
In addition, the employees have no freedom to choose between unions 
within the major federations. LO has full power to define the juris- 
diction of its member unions and can assign workers in particular 
trades or enterprises to a certain union.75 As the lines are drawn or 
changed, workers are required to transfer from one union to another 
to conform to these lines.76 The boundary between LO and TCO 
unions is not so rigidly drawn, but an agreement between the two 
federations has eliminated almost all competition and stifled the freedom 
of employees to choose between the two unions.77 
In the United States some of these same forces tend to limit the 
actual freedom to choose between unions, but on a much smaller scale. 
The American labor movement has been characterized by rival 
unionism.78 For twenty years the AFL and the CIO bitterly con- 
tested for members. Within the federations, national unions com- 
peted with each other because neither federation had the power to make 
binding decisions on jurisdiction.79 Some of this rivalry has been 
muted by the merger of the federations, and, through its no-raiding 
pact, the AFL-CIO has sought to reduce competition between member 
unions by providing for binding arbitration of disputes over repre- 
sentation rights.80 In the Textile Workers case,81 the court enforced 
an arbitrator's award ordering one of two competing unions to ask 
the NLRB to remove its name from the ballot in a pending election. 
This effectively deprived the employees of any freedom to choose be- 
tween possible representatives.82 The no-raiding pact, however, is a 
75 STADGAR FOR LANDSORGANISATIONEN I SVERIGE sec. 6, mom. 3, sec. 14, mom. 2; 
JOHNSTON, op. cit. supra note 73, at 66. 
76 STADGAR FOR LANDSORGANISATIONEN I SVERIGE sec. 11, mom. 2, sec. 14, mom. 1. 
77 See KARLBOM, DEN SVENSKA FACKF6RENINGSR6RELSEN 305-06 (1955); JOHN- 
STON, op. cit. supra note 73, at 106. For further efforts to eliminate boundary disputes 
see LO KONGRESS PROTOKOL, motions 51, 52, at 288-90 (1961). TCO has more trouble- 
some boundary problems with a third federation of professional or academically 
trained persons, Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation (SACO). See ILO, 
THE TRADE UNION SITUATION IN SWEDEN 36 (1961); Sj6berg, Organisatoriskt kaos 
utanfir Teleforbundet, 1960:40 FACKF6RENINGSRORELSEN 221-24. 
78 See generally GALENSON, RIVAL UNIONISM (1940). 
79 Krislov, Union Organizational Rivalry Among American Unions, 13 IND. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 216 (1960); Weber, Competitive Unionism in the Chemical Industry, 
13 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 16 (1959); Lehrer, The CIO Jurisdictional Dispute Ex- 
perience, 11 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 246 (1958); Jaffe, Inter-Union Disputes in Search 
of a Forum, 49 YALE L.J. 424 (1940). 
80 See GOLDBERG, AFL-CIO: LABOR UNITED 76-83, 271-82 (1956); Cole, Juris- 
dictional Issues and the Promise of Merger, 9 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 391 (1956). 81 United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 
1958). 
82 For a discussion of the operation of the no-raiding pact and its treatment by 
the NLRB, see Aaron, Interunion Representation Disputes and the NLRB, 36 TEXAS 
L. REV. 846 (1958). 
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relatively meager restraint. It does not reach unions such as the 
Teamsters which are outside the federation, and even within the 
federation it binds only those national unions which voluntarily join. 
Moreover, it does not apply to efforts to organize plants hitherto un- 
organized, but prevents competition only where one union already has 
an established bargaining relationship. The no-raiding pact cannot 
compare with LO's nearly complete power to draw the boundary lines 
between member unions, and is far less effective than the working 
agreement between LO and TCO to allocate organizational rights. 
Freedom of choice may be further limited in the United States by the 
lack of competing unions in many occupations or industries. Workers 
have little or no choice between unions in construction, trucking, rail- 
roads, music, or printing; and they often have no practical choice in 
the steel, rubber, automobile, and garment industries. Even so, rival 
unionism remains substantial in the United States, but is nearly non- 
existent in Sweden. The reality of choice is suggested by the fact that 
each year approximately 1,000 NLRB elections involving two or more 
unions are held, with some 150,000 workers voting.83 
Pattern bargaining in the United States has some of the same 
impact as national agreements in Sweden, for the union which sets the 
pattern limits the freedom of unions which are forced to follow.84 These 
patterns, however, lack the rigidity of Swedish national agreements 
even on strictly economic issues such as wages. In addition, collective 
agreements in the United States tend to cover a much wider range of 
subjects than in Sweden. Included are such matters as seniority, dis- 
charge, vacations, pensions, and health and welfare benefits.85 This 
provides much more flexibility to bargain both for noneconomic terms 
and for the allocation of economic benefits. Although American 
unions must follow the pattern, they can be more than scriveners 
scrupulously copying the agreements of other unions. They have 
an actual ability to represent, and the freedom of the workers to choose 
is therefore more than empty form. 
The freedom to choose between unions is not complete in either 
Sweden or the United States, for both the legal rules and the structure 
of bargaining are molded by practical needs. The legal rules in the 
United States deliberately limit full freedom by the principle of 
majority rule, but within that framework the freedom has substantial 
8326 NLRB ANN. REP. Table 13A (1961). 
84 See Ross, TRADE UNION WAGE POLICY (1948); Seltzer, Pattern Bargaining 
and the United Steelworkers, 59 J. POL. ECON. 322 (1951). 
8 In Sweden, collective agreements covering industrial workers commonly do 
not cover these subjects which are governed either by statute or left to management 
prerogative. However, collective agreements covering white collar workers do gen- 
erally cover these subjects. See ILO., op. cit. supra note 77, at 63-65. 
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reality. The legal rules in Sweden build upon the individualism of 
freedom of contract, but when contracts are made by collective en- 
tities such as the strong national unions and national employers' asso- 
ciations, there is little individual freedom to choose any other 
representatives. 
C. The Freedom Not To Join a Union 
Simple logic, reinforced by the appeal of verbal symmetry, makes 
the conclusion seemingly self-evident that freedom of association in- 
cludes the freedom not to associate. Indeed, from the standpoint of the 
individual, protection of the right to organize and the right to choose 
between organizations provides less than full freedom if there is no 
protection to remain outside all organization. This, however, assumes 
that the central purpose of protecting freedom of association is to pro- 
vide each separate individual full freedom of action. The law may, on 
the contrary, seek quite another goal. The principal or sole purpose 
may be to aid individuals to join together for collective action. In 
that case, it may protect the right to join, but not the right to remain 
outside, since the purpose of aiding collective action is not furthered by 
protecting those who reject collective action. Both Sweden and the 
United States, in enacting their basic labor laws, have struggled with 
these competing viewpoints as to the purpose of their respective stat- 
utes. Their contrasting conclusions reflect their different concepts 
of freedom of association in labor and industrial relations. 
The Swedish Freedom of Association Act of 1936 was preceded 
by seven years of study and public debate. The initial focus was the 
"third man's" right to neutrality in economic onflicts, and the emphasis 
was on protecting outsiders from being conscripted by battling col- 
lective groups. Underneath ran a deep concern for the individual's 
right of self-determination within a society dominated by large eco- 
nomic organizations. The proposals brought forth by the experts and 
commissions assigned to study the problem not only limited the use 
of economic force against the "third man" generally, but gave special 
protection to the right of association.86 This right was conceived in 
terms of individual self-determination, a d was defined as including 
both the right to join and the right to remain outside an association.87 
These proposals applied not only to unions and employer associations, 
but also to organizations of other economic groups such as farmers, 
86 Utredning Angaende Tredje Mans Ratt till Neutralitet i Arbetskonflikter, 
SOU 1933:36; Betankande med Forslag till Lag Angaende Vissa Ekonomiska 
Stridsatgarder M.M., SOU 1934:16. 
87 SOU 1933:36, at 136-37, 147; SOU 1934:16, at 11, 27. 
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tradesmen, and renters. Such organizations had effectively used the 
boycott and other forms of collective action to compel other individuals 
to join and to conform to collective decisions.88 These organizations, 
along with the unions, resisted legal limitations on their use of eco- 
nomic force, and the proposed legislation was defeated in a maelstrom 
of political controversy.89 A few months later, another expert com- 
mission brought forth a proposal to protect the right of association 
and collective bargaining only in the labor market.90 Like the earlier 
proposals, it defined the right of association as the "right to belong or 
not to belong" to an association and prohibited the use of economic 
force "to compel or hinder anyone to enter or withdraw from an asso- 
ciation." 91 The Confederation of Trade Unions supported the pro- 
posal generally, but opposed any protection of the right not to join.92 
The Government's bill followed this line, defining the right of associa- 
tion as "the right to belong" and making it a violation only if measures 
were taken against a person "to hinder him from entering or to compel 
him to withdraw from an association." The central purpose of the 
legislation, it was argued, was to protect the right of workers to bar- 
gain collectively; the right of association ought to be regulated only to 
the degree necessary for securing the right to bargain collectively. 
Protection of the right not to join was a part of the larger problem of 
limiting the use of collective force against third persons and did not 
logically belong in the statute.93 
The commission's proposal thus focused on the individual's right 
of self-determination and the government's bill focused on the value of 
collective action. One sought to protect the individual's full freedom 
of action; the other sought to protect only his right to organize for 
collective bargaining. The Riksdag evaded the issue. The statute, as 
enacted, contained the Delphic declaration that, "the right of associa- 
tion shall be inviolate," but contained no definition of that right or 
what constituted a violation.94 This fundamental question was shunted 
by default o the Labor Court. Confronted by the task of completing 
the statute, the Labor Court felt bound to follow the pattern of exist- 
ing law and looked to the content of the right of association which it 
88 See SOU 1933:36, at 56-84; HECKSCHER, STATEN OCH ORGANISATIONERNA 
88-89 (1951). 
89 See WESTERSTAHL, SVENSKA FACKFORENINGSR6RELSEN 397-404 (1945). 
i9Betakande med F6rslag till Lag Om F6renings-och F6rdhandlingsratt, SOU 
1935:59. 
91Id. ? 4. See also id. at 107, 115-16. 
92 Id. at 160-61. 
93 Proposition No. 240 (1936); Andra Lagutskottets Utlatande No. 58 (1936). 
D4 The history of this provision is traced in SOU 1939:49. 
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had held was an implied term in every collective agreement.95 The 
focus was therefore solely on the right essential to the existence of a 
collective bargaining relationship-the right to join together for col- 
lective action. The statutory right, thus shaped by the Labor Court in 
the image of the right implied in the collective contract, did not include 
the right of the individual to remain outside the collective relation- 
ship.96 
In 1940, the statute was amended to make the Labor Court's 
rule explicit. The right of association was defined as the "right to 
belong to an association," and a violation consisted of compelling a 
person "not to enter or to withdraw from an association." The indi- 
vidual was unprotected from economic pressures to compel him to enter 
or remain in a union. This partial protection of the right of associa- 
tion, it was argued, was all that was appropriate in a statute which had 
as its purpose securing the right to bargain collectively. More compre- 
hensive protection of the right, including the right not to belong, 
should await further studies then in progress.97 These other studies 
came to nought and the law remains unchanged-the individual has 
no right to remain unorganized. 
The current of developments in the United States has been in the 
opposite direction. When the National Labor Relations Act was 
passed in 1935, the concern was not with the power of unions, but the 
lack of effective unions.9 It was not necessary to protect the indi- 
vidual from collective groups, but rather to establish collective bargain- 
ing, and the stated purpose of the act was to encourage "the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining." 99 Section 7 stated the rights 
of employees only in the affirmative-"the right to self-organization, to 
form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . 
and to engage in concerted activities." Although section 8(3) pro- 
tected the right not to join a union by making it an unfair labor practice 
for an employer by discrimination in employment "to encourage or 
discourage membership in any labor organization," it expressly per- 
mitted a majority union to make an agreement requiring membership 
in the union as a condition of employment. The most significant re- 
striction on the individual's freedom to remain outside the collective 
structure was the exclusive representation rule. The individual 
05 See AD 1937:73. 
e AD 1937:73; AD 1937:150. 
97 SOU 1939:49, supra note 6, at 65. 
98 See BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 1-17, 84-99, 
100-11, 129-52 (1950). 
99NLRA ? 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. ?151 (1958). 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 14 Mar 2013 09:07:49 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
666 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:647 
could, in the absence of a union security clause, refuse to become 
a member of the majority union, but he could not escape being 
bound by its contract. Even here, however, he retained a small 
measure of independence, for section 9(a) provided that "any indi- 
vidual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any 
time to present grievances to their employer." 
In the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, the individual's freedom 
to refrain from collective action became a dominant heme. In addi- 
tion to the basic rights to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in 
concerted action, section 7 added a parallel "right to refrain from any 
or all of such activities." The statute made it an unfair labor practice 
for a union "to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of 
their rights guaranteed by section 7." 100 If employees became dis- 
satisfied with collective bargaining, they could obtain an election, by 
majority vote decertify the union, and revert to individual bargain- 
ing.10' Section 9(a) gave the individual increased freedom to process 
his own grievances and have them adjusted without the intervention 
of the majority union. The right of association was thus implicitly, 
but unmistakably, defined as including the right to remain unassociated, 
and the right not to join any union was equally protected with the 
right to choose between unions. Indeed, it is sometimes aid that the 
policy of the statute is no longer to encourage collective bargaining, 
but to protect employees in their freedom of choice as to whether they 
shall have collective bargaining. This freedom, however, is still sub- 
ject to majority rule; the individual is, even against his will, bound by 
the wishes of the majority in the bargaining unit. 
The Taft-Hartley Act further protected those who chose not to 
join or be represented by a union when it restricted the secondary 
boycott and thereby curtailed the unions' use of economic pressure to 
achieve representative status.'12 Some unions had traditionally refused 
to handle goods made in nonunion shops, to receive deliveries made by 
nonunion deliverymen, or to work on buildings in which nonunion 
workers were employed by other employers.103 By reducing the em- 
o0 LMRA ?8(b)(1), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. ?158(b)(1) (1958). 
O1 LMRA ?9(e), 61 Stat. 145 (1947), 29 U.S.C. ? 159(e) (1958). 
1O2LMRA ?8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. ? 158(b)(4) (1958). 
Secondary boycotts had previously been subject to various restrictions under state 
law. See Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YALE L.J. 341 
(1938); Note, Labor's Use of Secondary Boycotts, 15 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 327 
(1947). State law was displaced by the federal statute. San Diego Bldg. Trades 
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Although this changed details in the 
pattern of restrictions, it probably did not work any major change. 
103 See WOLMAN, THE BOYCOTT IN AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS (1916); LAIDLER, 
BOYCOTTS AND THE LABOR STRUGGLE (1914). 
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ployment opportunities of those who were not union members, the 
union brought economic pressure on them to join. These boycotts 
were sometimes used as sympathy measures in aid of a strike called 
by a majority union. More often, however, they were directed against 
enterprises in which the union did not have a majority, the purpose 
being to bring economic pressure on the employees to accept it as their 
bargaining representative.104 Although the Taft-Hartley Act curbed 
such measures in the name of protecting neutral employers, the indi- 
vidual's right not to join or be represented received substantial pro- 
tection. The Landrum-Griffin amendments in 1959 not only tightened 
these restrictions on secondary boycotts, but also blunted another eco- 
nomic weapon used by unions to obtain representative status-so-called 
organizational picketing.105 The union, by placing pickets in front of 
an establishment in which a majority of employees are nonunion, 
seeks to persuade potential customers not to buy, deliverymen not to 
deliver, and servicemen ot to enter. If such picketing is effective, it 
can threaten the enterprise with destruction; and destruction of the 
enterprise means destruction of employment. The nonunion employees, 
in order to save the business and their jobs, are compelled to accept the 
union as their bargaining agent. This device is now more closely 
limited by section 8(b)(7) which has as its articulated purpose the 
protection of the individual's freedom to choose which, if any, union 
shall represent him.106 
What the union seeks through various forms of secondary boy- 
cott and organizational picketing is to extend its representative status 
or bargaining power to employees in bargaining units in which it does 
not have a majority. Like the Swedish union, it seeks to regulate 
terms and conditions of employment of individuals who do not choose 
to be so regulated and whom the union is not legally authorized to 
104 See Brinker & Cullison, Secondary Boycotts in the U.S. Since 1947, 12 LAB. 
L.J. 397 (1961). Section 8(b)(4)(B) permits a certified union to use secondary 
economic pressure to compel an employer to recognize and bargain with it, but 
?8(b)(4)(C) prohibits the use of primary pressure to compel recognition when 
another union has been certified. 
105 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ? 8(b) (7), 73 Stat. 544 
(1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 158(b)(7) (Supp. IV, 1962). Prior to the statute, state courts 
had imposed varying limitations on such picketing probably of equal restrictiveness. 
Bornstein, Organizational Picketing in American Law, 46 KY. L.J. 25 (1957). See 
also, Meltzer, Recognition-Organizational Picketing and the Right-To-Work Laws, 
9 LAB. L.J. 55 (1958). 
106 The uncertain limits on such picketing were mapped out in Cox, The Landrum- 
Griffin Amendments to the NLRA, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257 (1959); Note, Picketing 
by an Uncertified Union: The New Section 8(b)(7), 69 YALE L.J. 1393 (1960). What 
the Board has made out of this section, and is still remaking, is suggested in Weiss, 
The Unlawful Object in 8(b)(7) Picketing, 13 LAB. L.J. 787 (1962); Comment, 
Appeals to the Consumer: The Remaining Area of Permissible Organizational Picket- 
ing Under Section 8(b)(7), 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 666 (1962). 
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represent.107 While the Swedish unions are legally free effectively 
to encompass all employees in the relevant labor market-in practice 
substantially the entire industry-, American unions are generally 
restricted to regulating employees in the statutory bargaining unit- 
commonly a small fragment of the competitive labor market. Although 
American law has not wholly prohibited the union from using economic 
pressure to extend its representative status or bargaining control, it 
has worked out no rational or intelligible body of rules to reconcile the 
individual's freedom to remain outside the collective structure with 
the union's interest in making its agreements applicable to employees 
beyond the narrowly defined boundaries of the bargaining unit. 
Swedish law has avoided these difficult problems imply by permitting 
the dominant national union to make its agreements practically binding 
on all employees regardless of their choice. 
The freedom not to join may be viewed at two distinct levels. The 
first is the freedom of the individual to stand outside the collective 
structure, to bargain for himself, and not be governed by the union's 
collective agreement. The second is the freedom of the individual who 
is governed by the collective agreement to refuse to be a member of the 
union, to be bound by its rules, or to contribute to its support. At the 
first level, the Swedish worker has little freedom in fact. Collective 
agreements blanket almost the entire labor market, and whether he is 
a member or not, his terms and conditions are controlled by the union's 
collective agreement. The American worker can much more readily 
remain beyond the union's control. Although collective agreements 
legally bind all in the bargaining unit, they cover only one-third of 
nonagricultural workers, and blanket only a limited number of indus- 
tries such as steel, auto, rubber, railroads, trucking, and maritime 
trades. In practical terms, the American worker can choose to reject 
collective bargaining but the Swedish worker cannot. The second level 
of the freedom not to join depends upon the extent and legality of col- 
lective agreements-union security or organization clauses-which 
require the worker, as a condition of his employment, to belong to the 
union or contribute to its support. 
II. UNION SECURITY OR ORGANIZATION CLAUSES 
The problem of freedom of association is cast in its boldest form 
when the collective agreement makes a worker's employment depend 
107 See Isaacson, Organizational Picketing: What Is the Law?-Ought the Law 
To Be Changed?, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 345 (1959). To such efforts the Board has 
now given its stamp of approval under the label of "area standards picketing." In- 
ternational Hod Carriers Union, 133 N.L.R.B. 512 (1961); Houston Bridge & Constr. 
Trades Council, 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962); Local 344, Retail Clerks Ass'n, 136 N.L. 
R.B. 1270 (1962). 
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on his membership or support of the union. By compelling his ad- 
herence to one union, it denies the individual both the freedom to 
choose between unions and the freedom to remain outside a union. 
The justification given for this limitation of freedom is that it 
strengthens the particular organization and makes association more 
effective. 
Contract provisions to this end-commonly referred to as "union 
security" clauses in the United States and as "organization" clauses in 
Sweden-not only pose fundamental questions of freedom of associa- 
tion, but also raise sharp issues of management prerogatives. From 
the employee's viewpoint, every organization clause encroaches on his 
freedom to choose which, if any, union he will join. From the em- 
ployer's viewpoint these provisions encroach on his freedom to choose 
which workers he will hire or retain. The closed shop agreement 
which requires the employer to hire only union members, particularly 
when coupled with the union-operated hiring hall, gives the union 
great control over the selection of employees. The union shop agree- 
ment which requires all employees to join, and remain members of, the 
union gives the union the power to compel the discharge of employees it 
deems undesirable by refusing them admission to, or expelling them 
from, the union. Even the agency shop agreement which requires all 
employees to pay a "bargaining fee" equal to union dues, compels an 
employer to discharge an employee whom he finds otherwise suitable, 
because the employee has failed to make the required payment to the 
union. Union security or organization clauses are thus at the center 
of two of the most troublesome areas in collective labor relations- 
the right of the individual within the collective labor relations system 
and the allocation between unions and management of control over 
that system. 
This convergance of the issues of individual rights and manage- 
ment prerogatives has made union security in the United States a 
vortex of controversy, with the two contributing issues wholly con- 
fused. The battle over union security has been bitter on both legal 
and economic fronts and continues with unabated if not increased 
vigor. So-called "right to work" laws have been the center of heated 
political debate, with nineteen states adopting such laws, twenty states 
rejecting them, and four states first enacting and then repealing them.l08 
108 SULTAN, RIGHT-To-WORK LAWS-A STUDY IN CONFLICT 56-61 (1958). The 
following states have such laws: Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 26, ? 375 (1958) ; Arizona, 
ARIZ. CONST. art. xxv, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ? 23-1301 (1956); Arkansas, ARK. 
CONST. amend. 34, ARK. STAT. ? 81-201 (1960) ; Florida, FLA. CONST. ? 12; Georgia, 
GA. CODE ANN. ? 54-801 (1961); Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. ? 40-2701 (Supp. 1961) ; 
Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. ? 736A.1 (Supp. 1962); Kansas, KAN. CONST. art. 15, ? 12; 
Mississippi, MIss. CONST. art. 7, ? 198-A; Nebraska, NEB. CONST. art. xv, ?? 13-15, 
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Union security was a central issue in the Taft-Hartley debates. Ex- 
cept for banning the closed shop, Congress never fully resolved the 
issue, and it now plagues both Congress and the courts. At the bar- 
gaining table the controversy has often been equally bitter. In 1952, 
in the midst of the Korean crisis, the entire steel industry was shut 
down for seven weeks because of a dispute over whether a union se- 
curity clause should be included in the collective agreement. 
In Sweden, organization clauses are neither the subject of po- 
litical debate nor the source of economic onflict. No legislation regu- 
lating such clauses has been seriously discussed since the Right of 
Association Act was amended in 1940. Organization clauses are sel- 
dom a significant issue in collective bargaining and are never produc- 
tive of a substantial strike. The controversy, so far as it exists, is a 
legal one fought in the courts; the adversaries are not union and 
management, but the LO unions and the competing Syndicalist unions. 
This litigation raises basic issues of freedom of association, but it is on 
the outer fringes of the labor relations system. The obvious question 
is, how did Sweden achieve such tranquility in this area which has 
proven so turbulent in the United States. 
A. Union Security as a Union-Management Issue- 
A Study in Contrast 
Some early Swedish unions sought to protect their members from 
competition for jobs by unorganized workers. These unions succeeded 
in obtaining scattered agreements, particularly in the building, bakery, 
and stevedoring industries, which required the employer to give job 
preference to union members.'09 The great majority of employers saw 
such clauses as threats since they challenged the employer's right to 
determine whom he would engage "and would make the employers in 
all of their business management and production dependent on the 
workers and their leaders." 10 The labor movement as a whole did 
not applaud these provisions. The movement's dominant socialist 
outlook frowned on efforts by one group of workers to obtain a 
monopoly on jobs to the exclusion of other workers. Protectionism 
NEB. REV. STAT. ? 48-217 (1959); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ? 613.230 (1961); North 
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ? 95-78 (1958); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE ? 34-01-14 
(1960); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ? 40-46 (1962); South Dakota, S.D. CODE ? 17.1101 
(Supp. 1960); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. ?50.208 (1955); Texas, TEX. REV. 
CIv. STAT. art. 5207a (1962); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. ?34-16-1 (Supp. 1963); 
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. ? 40-68 (1953); Wyoming, Wyo. Laws 1963, ch. 39. The 
Louisiana right to work law applies only to agricultural employees. LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. ? 23.889.1 (Supp. 1962). 
109LINDBOM, DEN SVENSKA FACKF6RENINGSR6RELSENS UPPKOMST OCH TIDIGARE 
HISTORIA 315-18 (1938). 
110 ADLERCREUTZ, KOLLEKTIVAVTALET 251 (1955). 
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was condemned as a violation of class solidarity."l This demand for 
solidarity, however, carried a threat to management prerogative in 
another form. Members refused to work with, and forced employers 
to discharge, those who failed to show solidarity by working during 
a strike or refusing to join the union.1l2 
These efforts by unions to enforce solidarity led the Swedish Em- 
ployers' Federation to amend its constitution in 1905 to include the 
important section 23.113 This section provided that every employer 
member in making a collective agreement "shall include a provision 
that the employer has the right to freely engage and dismiss workers, 
to direct and allot the work, and to employ workers belonging to any 
union or to none." The motivations for this amendment were set 
forth in the circular proposing it: 
From the labor unions' side there is carried on a persistent 
effort for the purpose of usurping the power to determine 
which workers an employer must use, and the unions wish 
also to reach the point where the union through its representa- 
tive in the plant shall be able to influence the direction of the 
work. This is a demand to which an employer can never sur- 
render. . . . The employers also have an obligation to those 
workers who are not organized or who do not belong to those 
organizations which have affiliated with LO or in the Social 
Democrat Party, to protect with all power the freedom of 
contract.ll4 
Section 23 triggered a series of bitter strikes which finally led 
the national confederations, SAF and LO, to negotiate the December 
Compromise of 1906.15 Under this agreement, which left a deep and 
permanent imprint on Swedish labor relations, the employers won 
recognition of their right to manage as expressed in section 23. At the 
same time, unions won express recognition of their right of association 
and protection against being discharged for union activities. Organ- 
ization clauses were thus wholly rejected, but the right to organize 
fully accepted. The Compromise took the form of a provision to be 
111 WESTERSTAXHL, SVENSKA FACKFORENINGSR6RELSEN 28-29 (1945). There was 
some tendency during the period of mass unemployment in the 1920's and 1930's for 
unions to attempt to monopolize available jobs, but the policy of solidarity was vigor- 
ously reaffirmed by LO, and all unions were required, as a condition of their affiliation 
with LO, to maintain open membership. KARLBOM, DEN SVENSKA FACKFORENINGS- 
RORELSEN 206-09 (1955); STADGAR F6R LANDSORGANISATIONEN I SVERIGE sec. 11, 
mom. 2. 
112 ALDERCREUTZ, op. cit. supra note 110, at 246-49. 
113 Now section 35. For a general study of this provision, see AMAN, PARAGRAF 
23 (1939). 
114 HALLENDORFF, SVENSKA ARBETSGIVAREF6RENINGEN 58 (1927). 
115 See notes 33-34 supra. 
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included in collective agreements. This provision remains today as a 
standard clause in the majority of Swedish collective agreements.116 
The December Compromise points to two significant con- 
trasts between Swedish and American experience in dealing with this 
troublesome issue at the bargaining table. First, Swedish unions and 
employers both saw the central issue as one of management preroga- 
tives. Although employers at times talked of "the freedom of work" 
and stated that "the right of the unorganized worker must be pro- 
vided for," 117 these were largely makeweight arguments. The issue 
was treated as a part of the larger problem of the union's right to par- 
ticipate in the decisions of the enterprise, and was resolved by the 
unions' conceding to management the prerogatives asserted in section 
23, thereby withdrawing their claim to a voice in determining who 
should be hired or retained. 
On the other hand, disputes over organization clauses in the 
United States are commonly fought on moral grounds, with the em- 
ployer playing the self-appointed role of guardian of individual rights.18 
In the steel strike during the Korean crisis, the president of U.S. Steel 
declared, "if the day ever comes when a man-in order to earn his 
living-must join one particular church, one particular party, or one 
favored union, then we may as well join forces with Russia . .. .119 
In the same vein was a statement by the steel companies justifying their 
refusal to give in to the union's demands: "We are shedding our blood 
and spreading our treasure in foreign lands for the sake of individual 
freedom. This freedom at home must be protected from every 
threat." 120 The unions have countered with the moral claims that the 
union has the right of survival and that all workers for whom the union 
bargains and whom the union is obligated to represent should pay 
116 Management's right of unquestioned control over discharges was somewhat 
softened by the Basic Agreement of 1938, negotiated between LO and SAF, which 
stated general guides to be followed in dismissals and layoffs. See SCHMIDT, LABOUR 
263-77. In such cases the union can call for negotiation and ultimately appeal to the 
Labor Market Board, a body made up of an equal number of representatives ofunions 
and employers associations with no impartial member. Its function is primarily 
conciliatory, and in twenty years only 40 cases have been appealed to it, with 13 
cases coming to a decision. This device has not proved satisfactory to the unions, 
for they have been compelled to accept what little the employers were willing to 
concede. See SCHMIDT, TJANSTEAVTALET 142-48 (1959). In 1961, LO finally re- 
solved to make a determined effort o change this by requiring employers to show 
objectively acceptable grounds for dismissals and by obtaining binding arbitration in 
such cases. See FACKF6RENINGSR6RELSEN OCH FORETAGSDEMOKRATIN (1961); LO 
KONGRESS PROTOKOLL 299-319, 372-79 (1961). The outcome of this effort is still 
uncertain. 
117 HALLENDORFF, op. cit. supra note 114, at 57-58; ADLERCREUTZ, op. cit. supra 
note 110, at 251. 
118 See TONER, THE CLOSED SHOP 115-47 (1942). 
119 SULTAN, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: A STUDY IN CONFLICT 55 (1958). 
120 Ibid. 
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their share of the costs.121 Moral issues are far from ideal subjects 
for collective bargaining, since public compromise then becomes awk- 
ward. The severity of the impasse has been manageable only because 
both sides have often been willing to surrender their moral claims for 
less noble but more tangible gains. 
The claim of management prerogatives has been understandably 
subdued, if not wholly silent, in these disputes. Employers in the 
United States have long conceded to unions a voice on dismissals and 
job assignments. Collective agreements commonly contain seniority 
clauses, prohibit discharge except for cause, and regulate job transfers 
and promotions. Indeed, employer insistence on a section 23-type 
provision would approach a refusal to bargain in good faith.122 The 
encroachments on management prerogatives of a legitimate organiza- 
tion clause are negligible when compared with the encroachments of 
other clauses which the employer egularly accepts.123 The employer's 
resistance has therefore been placed on grounds of individual rights- 
an issue which is not readily negotiable and leads to bitter conflict. 
The December Compromise's recognition of the Swedish unions' 
right to organize presents the second marked contrast between Swedish 
and American experience. The Compromise endured because the 
Swedish Employers' Federation genuinely accepted collective bargain- 
ing, did not attempt to undermine unions, and denied aid to employers 
who engaged in antiunion activities. In fact, employers within SAF 
actively encouraged their employees to join the LO unions. As a 
result, union membership within SAF has customarily been more com- 
plete than with other employers.124 Thus, even the management pre- 
rogatives asserted by section 23 do not give the unions a sense of 
insecurity. 
While Swedish employers were negotiating the December Com- 
promise, American employers were launching their "open shop" of- 
fensive. Although directed at compulsory unionism, the attack was on 
a broader front. An open shop meant not merely rejection of the 
closed shop, but refusal to recognize the union.125 Union members 
121 See TONER, op. cit. supra note 118, at 148-75; AFL-CIO, UNION SECURITY 
-THE CASE AGAINST THE RIGHT To WORK LAWS (1958). 
122 Cf. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); Order of Ry. 
Telegraphers v. Chicago N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960); Town & Country Mfg. 
Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962). 
123 See SLIGHTER, HEALY & LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
ON MANAGEMENT 947-51 (1960); Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to Manage- ment Control, in Management Rights and Labor Arbitration: A Symposium, 16 IND. 
& LAB. REL. REV. 183, 184-92 (1963). 
124 WESTERSTAHL, op. cit. supra note 111, at 166. 
125 See SULTAN, op. cit. supra note 119, at 21-30; TONER, op. cit. supra note 118, at 116-28. 
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would be hired, but if they struck they would be discharged, and col- 
lective bargaining was considered ealing with the devil. The position 
was baldly stated by the head of United States Steel Corporation in 
1919 when the union requested a meeting with management. "As you 
know, we do not confer, negotiate with, or combat labor unions as 
such. We stand for the open shop." 126 American employers thus 
bitterly resisted that which Swedish employers early conceded-the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. Union demands for closed 
or union shop were motivated largely by the fear that employers would 
undermine the union by replacing members with nonmembers. Organ- 
ization clauses were, in the American context, properly labelled "union 
security" clauses, for they were the union's shield in its continuing 
struggle for survival. The dispute remains virulent not only because 
of its historic bitterness, but also because unions still feel insecure and 
must often fight for their very lives.'27 
Union and employers in Sweden resolved the issue of organization 
clauses by a basic compromise in which employers secured their right 
to manage and unions secured their right to organize. Their vital 
collective interests ettled by bargaining, they left the issue of indi- 
vidual rights to be settled by legislation. In the United States, the 
employer has asserted the right of the individual worker to choose 
whether he will join, and the union has asserted its right to security. 
The issue in collective bargaining has thus been the two competing 
aspects of freedom of association-the right of individual freedom of 
choice and the right to effective organization. This dilemma becomes 
practically insoluble when the union fears, with substantial justifica- 
tion, that the employer is asserting individual rights to weaken or dis- 
integrate collective action. 
Other factors reinforce these differences in the nature of the prob- 
lem in the two countries. Since unionization is almost complete in 
Sweden, the union's collective power is not weakened by the few who 
remain outside. In the United States, organization is incomplete, and 
workers lack a sense of moral or social responsibility to support the 
union. In addition, the presence of competing unions aggravates the 
sense of insecurity. The fact that employees are able to choose be- 
tween unions causes the unions to seek contract provisions which limit 
that freedom of choice. 
126 TAFT, THE A.F. OF L. IN THE TIME OF GOMPERS 387 (1957). 
127 This does not mean that demands for union security clauses disappear when 
the union becomes secure. Even the railroad brotherhoods which have been organiza- 
tionally secure for nearly 30 years, and have obtained that security without any such 
help, still insist on the union shop. 
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B. The Extent of Compulsory Unionism 
Although section 23 only binds members of the Swedish Em- 
ployers' Federation, it exemplifies the dominant pattern. Other em- 
ployer associations, such as those in commerce, forestry, and news- 
paper publishing, follow the SAF policy of prohibiting organization 
clauses. In white collar industries uch as banking and insurance, the 
problem does not exist because the salaried employees' unions have not 
generally sought such clauses. The problem is also nonexistent in 
collective agreements with national, provincial, and local governments 
because the unions believe that organization clauses violate the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunity in public employment. 
In spite of this dominant pattern, organization clauses do present 
a significant problem in some branches of industry.128 In the shipping 
industry, agreements commonly provide that employers may hire only 
union members. If none are available the employer is required to 
cooperate with the union in organizing nonunion seamen who are 
hired. Most collective agreements with the various cooperative enter- 
prises require employees to join the union. In the building industry, 
about thirty percent of all workers are employed by employers outside 
the Swedish Employers' Federation, and almost all of these are cov- 
ered by some form of organization clause-some with a closed shop, 
but the majority with a union preference clause. In trucking, in which 
there are many small employers who do not belong to the employers' 
association, organization clauses are common. The exact extent of 
such clauses in Sweden is not known, for no comprehensive study has 
been made. It is quite clear, however, that although these clauses 
cover less than ten percent of all private employment, they are common 
in significant segments of industry. It is also clear that the LO unions 
generally seek such clauses when they are not blocked by firm employer 
association policies.129 
Although a collective agreement may not contain an organization 
clause, employment may in fact be conditioned on union membership. 
On the waterfront, employment is channelled through a hiring hall, 
operated by the stevedore employers' association, a member of SAF 
128 The tendency is to assume that the SAF position makes this problem one of 
academic interest only. See ILO, THE TRADE UNION SITUATION IN SWEDEN 31-32 
(1961); JOHNSTON, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SWEDEN 48 (1962). But see SCHMIDT, 
LABOUR 136; WESTERSTAHL, op. cit. supra note 111, at 164-67. 
129 Some trades, such as barbering, hairdressing, and chimney cleaning, have 
so-called "mutual organization" clauses which not only obligate the employer to hire 
only union members but also obligate union members to work only for members of 
the employers' association. 
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technically bound by section 23.130 Workers are classified for purposes 
of job priority as "ordinary," extra," or "casual." For a worker to 
advance from "casual" to "extra," or from "extra" to "ordinary," he 
must wait for a vacancy to arise and then apply to the employment 
office. If the union objects to the applicant, it makes its objections 
known to the office. Although the employers are nominally free to 
choose the worker to fill the vacancy, the union's objections are not 
lightly disregarded lest this lead to difficulties on the job. The union 
cultivates the impression, reinforced by practice, that applicants who 
are not members of the union will not be approved and thereby en- 
forces a virtual closed shop among regular harbor workers. In other 
industries, employers may respond to similar, though more subtle 
pressures. Many employers who belong to SAF and are bound by 
section 23 in fact give hiring preference to members of LO unions 
because they wish to maintain good relations with the union and avoid 
possible friction in the work force. 
Except in the stevedoring industry, hiring halls are rarely used, 
and employers seldom look to the union to provide needed workers. 
Instead, reliance is placed largely on the state employment service, even 
in the shipping, building, hotel, and restaurant industries, in which 
labor turnover is high. The use of the state employment service, how- 
ever, does not always solve the problem for workers who do not belong 
to LO unions.l31 The agency's "golden rule" is to "provide employers 
the kind of workers desired." If the employer indicates that he prefers 
union members, the agency cooperates by excluding nonmembers. In 
addition, it has been claimed by the Syndicalists that the local offices 
of the service are often administered by former officials of the LO 
unions who have at times discriminated against Syndicalists. In 
addition to using the state employment service, the building industry, 
particularly in Stockholm, often hires on a gang basis, with the em- 
ployer dealing directly with a gang leader to provide a group of 
workers of a particular craft. This system invites discrimination, for 
the work gang may refuse to take in those who are not union 
members.32 
130 The hiring system is described in detail in AD 1955:16. 
131 See AD 1950:27 for the difficulties of Syndicalist seamen applying for work 
through the state employment office. 
132 This danger is mitigated, however, by the prevalence of the piece rate or 
incentive system of pay in the building industry. Because the incentive pay is 
normally on a gang basis, the members of the gang are more concerned with their 
follow workers' productivity than with their political or union affiliation. Increased 
earnings provide a sufficient base for group solidarity. A Syndicalist who is a fast 
worker is often welcome in a working ang of LO members. 
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Although organization clauses cover but a small segment of 
Swedish industry, their presence is puzzling. Swedish unions do not 
need such clauses to protect themselves from employer attack. Nor 
are "free riders" who accept the union's benefits, but refuse to share 
its burdens, a substantial problem.133 At times, unions have sought 
to obtain a monopoly of available jobs, but this policy, which has been 
rejected, becomes self-defeating when the union has organized 95 per- 
cent of the labor market. In spite of this, unions seek organization 
clauses whenever employer resistance is not rigid. This is, in part, a 
reflection of a deep-rooted issatisfaction with anything less than 100 
percent solidarity and a particular antipathy for any form of rival 
unionism. Organization clauses have as their principal target the little 
band of Syndicalist unions which remain a thorn in the side of the LO 
unions. The justification for compelling them to join proceeds from 
the premise that the LO union is in fact the exclusive bargaining agent. 
Thus, when it was proposed at the Sheet Metal Workers convention 
that reprisals should not be imposed on those who for idealistic rea- 
sons joined the Syndicalists, the rationale was starkly stated: Such a 
worker was a "scab," and if he gets the benefits of the contract he 
should belong "after which he may have whatever ideals he will." 134 
The extent of union security clauses in the United States has 
formed quite a different pattern.135 Although employers have con- 
demned such provisions as immoral and a violation of individual rights, 
they have shown a marked tendency, once the union was established, 
to grant the union's demand. In 1941, the number of workers cov- 
ered by some form of union security clause represented 40 percent of 
all those under collective agreements.136 During World War II, the 
extent of union security agreements greatly increased, aided by the 
War Labor Board's policy of resolving disputes over this issue by 
ordering maintenance of membership clauses.137 When the Taft- 
133 Even without an organization clause, it is difficult for a man to remain out- 
side the union. The social pressure to join when almost all his fellow workers 
belong is extremely strong, and the worker comes to assume that when he takes 
a job he will also join the union. In the Municipal Workers Union, which has 
nearly 100% organization, it was found that 10% of the members were distinctly hostile to the union and perhaps a fifth would not have joined if they had felt 
fully free to do as they pleased. LINDBLAD, SVENSKA KOMMUNALARBETAREF6RBUNDET 
388-96 (1960). See also HECKSCHER, STATEN OCH ORGANISATIONERNA 87-89 (1951). 
134 SVENSKA BLECK-OCH PLATSLAGAREFORBUNDETS KONGRESS PROTOKOLL 72 
(1960). 
135 See generally TONER, op. cit. supra note 118, at 58-92. 
136 Peterson, Extent of Collective Bargaining at Beginning of 1942, 54 MONTHLY 
LABOR REV. 1066 (1942). 
137 See SEIDMAN, AMERICAN LABOR FROM DEFENSE TO RECONVERSION 91-108 
(1953); Jaffe, Union Security: A Study of The Emergence of Law, 91 U. PA. L. REv. 
275 (1942). 
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Hartley Act was passed, 78 percent of all employees working under 
collective agreements were covered by some form of union security 
device.138 That statute did not reverse the trend, for a representative 
sample eleven years later showed that the percentage so covered had 
risen to more than 80 percent.139 
The contrast betwen the two countries is thus sharpened. In the 
United States, although only a minority of employees are covered by 
collective agreements, nearly all of those covered are bound by union 
security provisions. In Sweden, nearly all employees are covered by 
collective agreements, but only a small minority are bound by organiza- 
tion clauses. From the viewpoint of the individual, the choice in the 
United States is whether he shall be governed by collective bargaining. 
Once that choice is made affirmatively b the majority in the appro- 
priate unit, he will normally have no choice but to support the ma- 
jority union. In Sweden there is no practical choice whether to be 
governed by collective bargaining, but there is normally a choice 
whether to join the union. 
C. Legal Limits on Organization Clauses in Sweden 
The right of association, protected by the Act of 1936, limits the 
legality of unions' and employers' conditioning employment on union 
membership. That right, however, is so circumscribed as to give sub- 
stantial room for the operation of organization clauses. As was pre- 
viously discussed, the statute protects the individual's right to choose 
between unions, but it does not protect his right to remain unorgan- 
ized. Thus, an employer who makes a contract containing an organ- 
ization clause with an LO union cannot lawfully discharge a member 
of the Syndicalists, but must discharge a worker who belongs to no 
union.140 Furthermore, the statute protects only those who are em- 
ployed, not those seeking work.14' Thus, an employer who has agreed 
to hire only members of an LO union cannot discharge Syndicalists he 
has inadvertently hired, but neither can he hire a worker who is not 
a member of the LO union.142 
138 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EXTENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND UNION 
RECOGNITION (Bull. 909, 1946). 
139 Theodore, Union Security Provisions in Major Union Contracts, 1958-59, 82 
MONTHLY LABOR REV. 1348 (1959). 
140AD 1945:30. If an employee leaves the LO union and joins the Syndicalists, 
he cannot be discharged, AD 1954:15, but if he simply fails to pay his dues or is 
expelled without joining another union, he can be discharged, AD 1959:17; AD 
1952:16. 
141 SOU 1939:49, at 70. 
142 AD 1952:18. 
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Although the worker who is employed is fully protected in his 
choice of unions, this protection continues only for the life of the job. 
When employment ends, he loses his statutory shield and becomes a 
defenseless job seeker. The Labor Court has been niggardly in ex- 
tending statutory protection and has been markedly reluctant o find 
that successive jobs for the same employer amount to continuous em- 
ployment. In one case, a Syndicalist construction worker had been 
employed in digging test holes for a proposed garage. When the 
ground proved inappropriate, he was told that new plans would have 
to be drawn and new tests made on another site about one hundred 
yards from the first. He was to told to "inquire concerning the work 
later on." Nine days later he heard that the employer had hired two 
new workers who were LO members. When he inquired, he was told 
that he was not given the work because the employer was required 
by an organization clause to hire only LO members. The Labor Court 
declared that because lay-offs were not generally used in the building 
industry, the Syndicalist's employment should be treated as having 
been terminated, and that the refusal to rehire was therefore no viola- 
tion of his right of association.143 In another case, a construction em- 
ployer told a Syndicalist worker that when the building was finished, 
he would be sent with the crew to another location if he would join the 
LO union to comply with the organization clause. Although it was 
customary for an employer to move an entire work crew from one 
building to another, the Labor Court held that the employment in this 
case was for only one job at a time, and that the transfer to a new 
location was new employment. There was, therefore, no violation.144 
The Labor Court has not been quite so dryly logical in dealing 
with employment on the waterfront. Harbor workers who hold cards 
as "ordinaries" or "extras" have been declared to be employees even 
though they constantly move from job to job, because the Court has 
recognized that such cards, in fact, provide the workers with regular 
employment. Refusal to give jobs to workers holding such cards, or 
refusal to promote from "extra" to "ordinary" because the workers 
are Syndicalists, is therefore a denial of the right of association. How- 
ever, those holding cards as "casuals" are held not to be employees, 
143 AD 1951:21. 
144 AD 1949:72. It is questionable whether these decisions fulfill the intention 
of those who drafted the statute. The commission report, in explaining the statute, stated that "the real relation ought to be decisive and not the choice of words which 
are used. Similarly it ought to be noted that even if on a shutdown a dismissal of 
the work force must be considered to have occurred, a refusal on a later resumption 
to recall the workers could under special circumstances constitute a violation of the 
right of association". SOU 1939:49, at 70-71. The Labor Court has been more 
lenient in finding continuous employment where seasonal workers have been rehired 
year after year. AD 1959:10; AD 1944:97. 
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and refusal to promote them to "extras" because of union membership 
does not violate the statute.145 Thus, Syndicalists can be systematically 
barred from achieving the status which would ensure them regular 
employment. 
These decisions defining the legal limits of organization clauses 
make clear that members of a competing union such as the Syndicalists 
get little practical protection.l46 Members are protected for the dura- 
tion of their jobs, but organization clauses exist primarily in industries 
such as building or shipping, which typically have short-lived jobs. 
The worker is then blocked from further employment until he joins 
the LO union. The Court's restrictive application of the statute ag- 
gravates its failure to protect the job-seeker, and the individual is often 
left without protection. 
The most marked characteristic of the organization clause cases is 
the ambivalent attitude shown by the Labor Court to the individual's 
right to choose which union to join and support. The court is com- 
posed of two representatives from the major labor federations, LO 
and TCO;147 two representatives from the employers' associations; 
and three public members. The court at times has been unable to 
find in the law any protection for competing unionism, more specifically 
the Syndicalists.148 This tendency is especially apparent in the union 
and employer members on the court. When the act was first passed, 
union members on the court insisted that an organization clause in a 
collective agreement overrode the statutory right of association of 
Syndicalist employees.149 The union members eventually obtained the 
support of the employer members, and the court held that employees 
hired after a contract had been signed could be discharged under an 
organization clause, even though they belonged to the rival union.150 
This position was reversed by amending the statute in 1940 explicitly to 
provide that the employer and union could not by agreement reduce 
the individual's right of association.151 
Reluctance to protect the Syndicalists, however, did not disappear. 
In 1945, an employer who had discharged a Syndicalist under an 
145 AD 1955:16. 
146 See SCHMIDT, LABOUR 142. 
147 Normally two representatives of LO sit as labor members, but in cases in- 
volving salaried employees a representative of TCO sits as a substitute for one of 
the labor members. Labor Court Act ? 4, cited in SCHMIDT, LABOUR 246. 
148 The cases have been analyzed fully with particular emphasis on the positions 
taken by the various members of the Labor Court in GEIJER & SCHMIDT, ARBETAGIVARE 
OCH FACKF6RENINGSLEDARE I DOMARSATE 90-111 (1958). 
149 AD 1937:73; AD 1937:88 (dissenting opinions). 
150 AD 1939:24. 
151 Right of Association Act ? 3; see SOU 1939:49, at 68-69. 
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organization clause argued before the Labor Court that he had never 
urged the employee to leave the Syndicalist union, but only to join the 
LO union, and that the worker could legitimately belong to both 
unions. The union and employer members of the court overrode the 
public members and held that requiring an employee to join the LO 
union did not violate his right to belong to the union of his choice so 
long as he was not required to leave the Syndicalist union.152 In a 
subsequent case, the Syndicalists argued that double membership was 
prohibited by their local rules, and that these rules had been declared 
valid and binding by the central organization. This, however, proved 
to be no obstacle for the union and employer members of the court 
since they felt free to overrule the Syndicalists' interpretation of their 
own constitution, and declare the local rule void.153 The public mem- 
bers uniformly dissented in these cases and pointed out that double 
membership was meaningless. It subjected the employee to conflicting 
demands of loyalty and solidarity, created a risk that he would be dis- 
trusted and harassed, and required him to pay double union dues. 
Therefore, compelling him to join the LO union, in practical terms, 
interfered with his right to belong to the Syndicalists and to work for 
the building of that union. 
These cases caused the Syndicalists to lodge a protest with the 
Solicitor of Justice (Justitieombudsman) that organizational bias was 
dominating judicial decisions. The Solicitor, after inquiry, declared 
that the decisions conflicted with the underlying reasons for protect- 
ing the right of association and rested on assumptions so divorced from 
reality that they ought not to be seriously entertained. He recom- 
mended that the statute be amended to expressly overrule these deci- 
sions.154 Before parliament could act, however, another double mem- 
bership case came before the Labor Court. The union and employer 
members now voted unanimously to overrule the prior cases and adopt 
the position of the public members and the Solicitor.155 
Although the specious concept of double membership was thus 
laid to rest, the unwillingness of the Labor Court to protect the 
Syndicalists from overreaching by the LO union persists in the 
"measuring monopoly" cases. In the building industry, workers are 
paid on a group piece rate incentive system, with "measuring men" 
152 AD 1945:35; AD 1945:36; AD 1945:77; AD 1946:41. In the last case, one employer member expressed grave doubts about this position, but found that it did not violate a strict construction of the statute and voted with the other union and 
employer members. 
153 AD 1946:59; AD 1946:64. 
154 JO's AMBETSBERATTELSE 1948, at 185. 
155 AD 1948:21. See also AD 1950:27; AD 1954:15. 
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appointed by the employees and employers to apply the often complex 
and uncertain formulas and jointly determine the total wages due the 
group. Prior to 1946, each work group had full freedom to choose its 
own measuring man, and usually chose one from the union representing 
the majority of workers in the group, his fee being paid by the members 
of the group. In 1946, the LO unions in the building industry suc- 
ceeded in negotiating agreements with the employers' associations re- 
quiring that all employee measuring men be members of the LO, and 
that the fee be deducted from the wages of the group and paid to the 
LO measuring office.l56 These provisions were applicable even though 
none of the workers in the group were members of the LO union.157 
The stated purpose of these provisions was to insure compliance with 
the contract, but it was generally understood to be aimed in part at 
the Syndicalists who had measuring offices. 
The Syndicalists did not obtain protection from the Labor Court. 
They claimed that the employer's refusal to engage in joint measuring 
with the Syndicalist measuring man deprived their members of the 
right to be represented by their own union. Despite the fact that the 
measuring men often discussed questionable items and negotiated 
differences to reach an agreement, the court held that measuring was 
not negotiation in a proper sense, but only a technical procedure for 
obtaining evidence of the nature and amount of work performed.158 
Second, the Syndicalists also claimed that deducting the measuring 
fee from their wages and paying it over to the LO union prevented 
them from using their own measuring office without paying a double 
fee. The court, however, saw nothing wrong in an employee's being 
required to pay for this "technical procedure" in determining his wage, 
even though it was done by a competing union.59 The Syndicalists 
further proved that the amounts paid to the LO unions as measuring 
fees exceeded the actual cost of measuring, and that the surplus was 
being used for general union purposes. This, the court admitted, was 
a violation of the right of association, for Syndicalists were thereby 
compelled to support the LO unions-the same vice as double member- 
ship. However, since the employer did not know that the amount 
was in excess of actual measuring costs, he could not be found to have 
156 The history of this provision and its application are recounted in AD 1960:16. 
157 AD 1946:51. The Syndicalists sued the employers to recover the amount paid 
over to the LO union, but the court held that the LO collective agreement established 
a usage at the work place which became a part of the syndicalists' employment con- 
tract. They had therefore impliedly agreed that the amount should be deducted 
from their pay and paid over to the LO union! 1948 N.J.A. 1. This decision has 
been questioned in SCHMIDT, TJANSTEAVTALET 64-65 (1958). 
158 AD 1947:50 (one public member dissenting). 
159 AD 1948:78 (one public member dissenting). 
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violated the Syndicalists' right of association.160 Subsequent decisions 
have solidified LO's measuring monopoly, requiring Syndicalists in 
effect o be represented by, and to support, the LO union.161 
Although the Freedom of Association Act purports to protect 
the individual's right to join and support the union of his choice, the 
Syndicalist cases make clear that the law in fact provides little pro- 
tection. This derives partly from the wording of the statute and partly 
from the Labor Court's restrictive application of it. Both, however, 
have common roots-the pervasive influence of the dominant labor 
and employer organizations on the process of lawmaking. In 1936, 
LO succeeded in removing from the proposed statute a provision 
expressly protecting the right to remain outside a union, and in 1940 
succeeded in making explicit the limited protection of the right of 
association. Although SAF initially championed the rights of the 
nonmember, it did not press for any wider definition of the statutory 
right.162 In the Labor Court, the representatives of the collective 
parties have tended to shape the law to protect their collective inter- 
ests.163 When confronted with competing unionism, their interests 
unite. The employers do not welcome the friction and disruption that 
comes with rival unions, but prefer bargaining with a single union 
for all employees. The SAF, with its system of centralized bargaining 
and national agreements, is especially hostile to the Syndicalist creed of 
local autonomy. The employers' hostility to the Syndicalists is only 
a little less than that of the LO unions. The public members of the 
Labor Court, constantly confronted with the view of both sides that 
competing unionism is disruptive of the collective bargaining system, 
may lose their enthusiasm for protecting this fragmentary organiza- 
tion beyond what is required by the clear words of the statute. As a 
result the rights of the individual may be submerged by the collective 
interests. 
The historic opposition of SAF to union security agreements 
might seem at first glance to lead it to favor legal limitations on 
160 AD 1954:19, 20. As the result of this decision, the Syndicalists ued the 
LO union and the employer for the amount improperly deducted from their pay. 
They recovered a judgment against the union of 70 crowns and costs of 5,500 crowns 
but were ordered to pay the employer's costs of more than 2,500 crowns. 
161 See AD 1960:16, where the Labor Court upheld the LO's levy of a flat 4% 
measuring charge on all jobs, even those of Syndicalists which were relatively 
simple and required little effort or technical skill. These measuring monopoly cases 
have been sharply criticized in SCHMIDT, LABOUR 140-41. 
162 See SOU 1939:49, at 30. 
163 As pointed out in GEIJER & SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 148, at 109, "In the 
organization clause cases and the cases concerning measuring fees it stands out clearly 
that the layman members certainly have an interest hat the right of association be pro- 
tected, but not to such an extent that it encroaches on the LO organizations' organiz- 
ing efforts. The right of association stands out as an exclusive protection for the 
LO affiliates." 
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organization clauses. However, its ability to maintain essentially 
intact the policy of section 23, and particularly to block at the bargain- 
ing table any demands for organization clauses, makes aid from the 
law quite unnecessary so far as its members are concerned. The 
existence of such clauses outside SAF is no threat and of little con- 
cern, for unions neither hope nor press for any change within SAF 
in this regard. Able to protect its management prerogatives at the 
bargaining table, SAF does not seek to protect individual rights by 
law. 
D. Legal Limitations on Union Security in the United States 
In the United States, legal limitations on union security clauses 
or the use of economic force to obtain such clauses have followed no 
stable or consistent pattern. At the turn of the century, a number 
of state courts condemned the closed or union shop as creating a 
monopoly, and enjoined strikes and picketing to achieve such objec- 
tives.164 This reflected less a concern for the rights of the individual 
than a general judicial hostility to unions and collective action. As 
this hostility gave way to judicial acceptance of collective bargaining 
and tolerance of resort to economic force, the attitude toward union 
security softened. Courts in some states, particularly highly indus- 
trialized states such as New York, completely reversed their position, 
giving the union full freedom to obtain and enforce closed shop agree- 
ments; 165 the Massachusetts courts recognized such contracts as 
enforceable, but enjoined any use of economic force to obtain them.166 
Other courts, however, continued their rigid rejection of all union 
security.167 In 1935, when Congress passed the National Labor Re- 
lations Act, the law on this point was a patchwork of varying state 
rules, with a substantial number, if not a majority, of states placing 
strict limitations or prohibitions on union security agreements.168 
The broad declaration in Section 7 of the NLRA of the right 
of employees to join unions and to bargain collectively "through repre- 
164 See, e.g., Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600 (1913); O'Brien v. 
People, 216 Ill. 354, 75 N.E. 108 (1905); Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 
N.E. 603 (1905); Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 Atl. 327 (1903). 
165 Compare Curran v. Galen, 152 N.Y. 33, 46 N.E. 297 (1897), with Williams v. 
Quill, 277 N.Y. 1, 12 N.E.2d 547 (1938). See also Cohen & Roth Elec. Co. v. 
Bricklayers Union, 92 Conn. 161, 101 Atl. 659 (1917). 
166Hamer v. Nashawena Mills, Inc., 353 Mass. 160, 52 N.E.2d 22 (1943); 
Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N.E.2d 1 (1943). 
167 Canter Sample Furniture House, Inc. v. Retail Furniture Employees, 122 
N.J. Eq. 575, 196 Atl. 210 (Ch. 1937). See generally Despres, The Collective Agree- 
ment for the Union Shop, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 24 (1939). 
168 Closed shop agreements, however, were legal in most of the industrial states 
where organization was more extensive, so that the majority of unions could legally 
have union security agreements. 
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sentatives of their own choosing," and the specific prohibition of 
section 8(3) against discrimination in employment "to encourage or 
discourage membership in any labor organization," would have out- 
lawed all union security agreements. However, the central purpose 
of the statute was to protect unions from employer attacks and to 
promote the process of collective bargaining. Outlawing union secu- 
rity agreements would have deprived unions of an existing device for 
self-protection and unsettled established collective agreements. There- 
fore, section 8(3) was qualified so it would not preclude an employer 
from making a union security agreement with the union representing 
his employees. This limitation on the individual's freedom was closely 
circumscribed by the National Labor Relations Board and the courts. 
Discharges of nonunion employees must be based on an explicit pro- 
vision in the collective agreement, not on an informal understanding 
or practice; 69 and the agreement must be with a majority union 
which had obtained its majority without a union security clause or 
other aid from the employer.170 Nor could an employee be discharged 
because he had been expelled by the union for supporting a rival 
union during a campaign preceding a Board election.171 The collective 
parties could not by their agreement interfere with the individual's 
freedom in choosing the majority representative. Even within these 
limits, union security agreements, or strikes or picketing to achieve 
them, were subject to the restrictions imposed by the patchwork of 
state laws.172 
In the public discussion and legislative debates prior to the 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, union security was one of 
the critical issues. The Senate Committee on Labor observed that, in 
spite of state rules, over 70 percent of all collective agreements con- 
tained union security provisions, and then declared: "Abuses of com- 
pulsory membership have become so numerous there has been great 
public feeling against such arrangements." 173 Among the claimed 
abuses were union monopoly over available work to the detriment of 
nonunion workers; threats of expulsion and consequent loss of job 
by union leaders to silence criticism within the union, eliminate oppo- 
sition leaders, and curb the political freedom of members; and 
169 South Atlantic SS. Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1941). 
170 NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U.S. 685 (1942). 
171Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 
44 N.L.R.B. 587 (1942). The Rutland Court doctrine was ultimately overruled by 
the Supreme Court as beyond the Board's power under the Wagner Act, Colgate- 
Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355 (1949), but by this time the Taft- 
Hartley amendments had made the protection explicit. 
172 Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 
336 U.S. 30 (1949). 
173 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1947). 
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deprivation of management's choice of the workers it hires.174 At 
the same time, it was recognized that the majority union which acted 
as bargaining representative and had the statutory duty to represent 
all employees in the bargaining unit was entitled to financial support 
by all who shared in the benefits. 
In attempting to reconcile the intersecting interests of the indi- 
vidual, management, and the union, Congress replaced the proviso of 
section 8(3)-now 8 (a) (3)-with a verbally snarled proviso which 
has the effect of barring all forms of union security, except what might 
be roughly termed "compulsory dues." The statute clearly outlaws 
the closed shop or union preference which makes original hiring 
depend on union membership, since employment cannot be conditioned 
on membership until thirty days after employment begins. Even after 
the thirty days the employee cannot be discharged if "membership is 
denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee 
to tender periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required." In 
applying the statute, the National Labor Relations Board has narrowly 
restricted the obligations which the union can impose on unwilling 
employees. Thus, the Board has held that an employee who refused 
to sign an application for membership, appear at a union meeting, or 
take an oath of loyalty to the union could not be discharged under 
a union security agreement if he tendered the regular dues and 
initiation fees.175 Nor can he be discharged because he was expelled 
from the union for refusal to pay special assessments or fines, failure 
to attend union meetings, strike breaking, or working for a rival 
union.176 In short, the individual cannot be compelled to join the 
union, to participate in union activities, or obey union rules.'77 How- 
ever, he can be compelled to contribute financial support to the union 
which serves as his statutory representative.178 
The underlying policy that the majority union was entitled to 
financial support from those for whom it bargained was only grudgingly 
and partially accepted. The union's right to compel financial support 
was made dependent first on state law. Section 14(b) of the statute 
expressly preserved the power of each state to prohibit the execution 
174 Id. at 6. 
175 See Union Starch & Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 188 F.2d 
1008 (7th Cir. 1951). 
176 NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953); Miami Valley 
Carpenters' Dist. Council, 129 N.L.R.B. 517 (1960); American Bakery & Con- 
fectionary Workers, 128 N.L.R.B. 937 (1960); Electric Auto-Lite Co., 92 N.L.RB. 
1073 (1950), aff'd, 196 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 823 (1952). 
177 See Toner, The Taft-Hartley Union Shop Does Not Force Anyone To Join A 
Union, 6 LAB. L.J. 690 (1955). 
178 If he is denied membership or expelled it seems he would not be compelled 
to support the union financially. 
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and application of all forms of union security agreements. This has 
spawned a series of campaigns for the enactment of state "right to 
work" laws, the primary impact of which would be to outlaw the 
"compulsory dues" agreements permitted by the federal statute.179 
The union's right to financial support is further dependent on 
its obtaining a union security agreement from the employer.180 This 
may be extremely difficult, even though the employer has only a 
minimal interest of his own at stake. His freedom to choose new 
employees is in no way curtailed by a union security clause, and his 
freedom to retain employees is not subject to veto by the union. His 
management prerogatives are restricted only to the extent that he 
cannot retain those few employees who, out of principle or neglect, 
fail to pay the union dues. Thus, in bargaining over union security, 
the employer is bargaining over the competing claims of the union and 
the individual. The drafters of the statute conceived of the employer 
as the protector of the individual against the union, but employers 
have not proven themselves guardians of the workers' rights or 
pocketbooks. Employer resistance to a union security clause, if it 
does not flow from fear of union strength, may be but a bargaining 
tactic, enabling the employer to trade union security for some economic 
concession. The individual's obligation to support the union thus be- 
comes an employer's weapon on the bargaining table, for which the 
union, and ultimately those it represents, must pay a price. 
The statute, by prohibiting even compulsory dues during the first 
thirty days of employment, destroyed much of the practical value of 
a union security clause in those industries in which employment is 
typically short term.181 However, under the 1959 amendments, union 
security clauses in the building and construction industry can require 
"membership"-that is, dues payment-after seven days.182 Dock 
179 For some sample discussions of this controversy see AFL-CIO, UNION 
SECURITY: THE CASE AGAINST THE RIGHT To WORK LAWS (1958); MEYERS, RIGHT 
To WORK IN PRACTICE (1959); SULTAN, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: A STUDY IN 
CONFLICT (1958); Pollitt, Right To Work Law Issues: An Evidentiary Approach, 
37 N.C.L. REV. 233 (1959). 
180 The Taft-Hartley Act provided that before negotiating a union security clause 
a majority of all the employees in the unit must have voted for such a provision in 
an election held by the Board. In the first three years of the statute, 45,000 such 
elections were held and the unions won 97%. 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 10 (1951). 
Congress then removed this requirement from the law. However, there still remains 
the provision in section 9(e) that if 30% of the employees petition the Board it 
shall hold an election to determine whether the union should be decertified. This 
has not been extensively used, but the union's record in these elections has been 
progressively poorer. Morgan, The Union Shop Deauthorization Poll, 12 IND. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 79 (1958). 
181 Note, Special Labor Problems in the Construction I dustry, 10 STAN. L. REV. 
525 (1958). 
182 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ?705, 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 
29 U.S.C. ? 158(f) (Supp. IV, 1962); Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1112 (1960). 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 14 Mar 2013 09:07:49 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
688 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:647 
workers are now hired largely through hiring halls and must join 
thirty days after their first assignment. 
Union security under Taft-Hartley contains a potential element of 
double membership like that ultimately rejected by the Swedish Labor 
Court. A member of one union can be compelled to contribute to a 
rival union which has a union security agreement. Hie may be 
burdened with double dues, but here the similarity ends. He need not 
give the rival majority union any loyalty, and in fact can actively work 
against it, for expulsion cannot lead to discharge. The double financial 
burden has not proven a serious impediment to activity on behalf 
of the minority or outside union. A new representation election is 
available within three years, with an opportunity to unseat the rival 
and void its union security agreement. The Swedish employee sub- 
jected to double membership had no such freedom of action, for viola- 
tion of union rules could lead to discharge. Furthermore, he had no 
opportunity to escape by winning over a majority of his fellow em- 
ployees, for there was no procedure for unseating the dominant union. 
He had no prospect but continued subjection to the double burden. 
The Swedish "measuring monopoly" agreements in the building 
industry bear much closer resemblance in purpose and impact to the 
Taft-Hartley union shop. The Swedish union, by such a clause, be- 
comes the exclusive bargaining representative in measuring the work 
done, and is able to require each employee to bear his share of the 
costs. This is the "compulsory dues" logic of Taft-Hartley. How- 
ever, the Swedish union can only charge for costs of the particular 
bargaining services, whereas the American union can charge "regular 
periodic dues" which may include amounts for education, recreation, 
charities, and other activities remote from the bargaining process.l83 
A more critical distinction is that the Swedish union's right to repre- 
sent, and exact a charge for representing, does not rest on a majority 
choice of the employees in the work group. Indeed, the employers 
agreed that the LO unions should control the measuring even though 
all the employees in the work group were members of a competing 
union, and in addition, the law provides no procedure whereby they 
can escape this monopoly control. The union's right to financial 
support in the United States rests on its majority status; in Sweden 
it rests solely on the employer's consent. 
The union security device which has caused the most difficult 
legal problems under Taft-Hartley is the agreement that the employer 
183 There is doubt whether it can include amounts spent by the union for support 
of political candidates or political activities with which the individual disagrees. See 
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Brotherhood of 
Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963). 
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shall hire employees through the union-operated hiring hall. Such 
hiring halls have been integral parts of collective bargaining structures 
in a number of industries, particularly construction, maritime, steve- 
doring, and some portions of trucking where employment is typically 
short term.'84 They served as private employment agencies to bring 
together workers seeking jobs and employers in need of workers. They 
provided a system of job priority in those industries in which short 
term employment made ordinary seniority arrangements inapplicable. 
Normally the hiring hall was combined with the closed shop, and 
union members were referred to jobs on a rotation basis. Union 
membership was often limited to the number who could be regularly 
employed, and during busy seasons when all union members were 
employed, nonunion workers were assigned to vacancies upon the 
payment of a permit fee. The hiring hall thus provided a rough form 
of industrial seniority, giving priority to union members who were 
presumably those permanently attached to the industry.185 Finally, by 
control of job assignments through the hiring hall, the union could 
compel compliance with all union rules and financial obligations, 
either by the threat of expulsion or the more subtle method of manip- 
ulating job assignments. 
Taft-Hartley clearly outlawed the traditional closed-shop hiring 
hall arrangement. Even though the collective agreement contains no 
closed shop clause, if the employer agrees to hire only those referred 
to him by the union, and the union refuses to refer nonmembers, the 
statute is clearly violated. The problem arises when there is no 
proof that the union has refused to refer nonmembers. Although 
there is no evidence of actual discrimination against nonmembers, 
workers may believe that they will in fact fare better at the hiring hall 
if they are good union members. The employer's insistence that they 
be "cleared" by the hiring hall interferes to this extent with their free 
choice of unions and encourages them to join the one with the hiring 
hall agreement. From this it might be concluded that all such hiring 
hall agreements were prohibited. However, the legislative debates 
indicated that although Congress considered union hiring halls prime 
offenders in coercing workers and closing the labor market, it also 
recognized that they were highly useful in devising rational employment 
184 See GOLDBERG, THE MARITIME STORY (1958); LARROWE, MARITIME LABOR 
RELATIONS ON THE GREAT LAKES (1959); LARROWE, SHAPE-UP AND HIRING HALL 
(1955); Craig, Hiring Hall Arrangements and Practices, 9 LAB. L.J. 939 (1958); 
Fenton, Union Hiring Halls Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 9 LAB. L.J. 505 (1958); 
Rains, Construction Trades Hiring Halls, 10 LAB. L.J. 363 (1959). 
185 See TONER, THE CLOSED SHOP (1942); Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against 
Exclusion From Union Activities, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 21, 34-36 (1961); Sherman, 
Legal Status of the Building and Construction Trades Unions in the Hiring Process, 
47 GEO. L.J. 203, 217-19 (1958). 
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systems in casual labor industries uch as construction, stevedoring, 
and shipping.186 Congress did not intend to outlaw all hiring halls, 
but it gave no guidance on the question of how a union hiring hall 
could be operated without unlawfully encouraging those seeking work 
to join the union. 
Ten years after the statute was passed, the NLRB finally con- 
fronted this dilemma, and in its famous Mountain Pacific 187 decision 
held that even though no actual discrimination was shown, the very 
making of a hiring hall agreement was a violation of the act unless 
it met three standards. To be legal the collective agreement must 
explicitly provide that (1) referrals to jobs shall be without regard 
to union membership; (2) the employer retains the right to reject 
any worker referred by the union; and (3) notices are to be posted 
at the hiring hall stating the nondiscriminatory standards for re- 
ferrals. Failure to include these safeguards in the collective agreement 
made both the union and the employer subject to the so-called "Brown- 
Olds 188 remedy" requiring them to pay back to the workers employed 
through the hiring hall all of the union dues collected during a six- 
month period.189 
The first and third Mountain Pacific requirements are obviously 
designed to reduce the fear on the part of workers that the union's 
control of hiring will be used to discriminate against those who are 
not members in good standing. The second requirement, however, 
serves no such purpose, for the employer's right to reject any worker 
referred by the hall gives no protection to those denied referral. 
The union still controls a gate on the path to employment. This 
requirement does not protect the worker's right to choose his union, 
but rather the employer's right to choose his employees. Section 
8(a) (3) was read as prohibiting not only encroachments on the indi- 
vidual's freedom of association, but also limitations on management 
prerogatives. The evil, in the eyes of the Board, was the "surrender 
of the normal management hiring prerogative to the union"; 10 this 
186 The legislative history of Taft-Hartley tends to suggest that the proponents 
of the legislation viewed hiring hall agreements as inherently discriminatory and 
inseparable from the closed shop. See Note, Unilateral Union Control of Hiring 
Halls: The Wrong and the Remedy, 70 YALE L.J. 661 (1961). However, three 
years later Senator Taft asserted that the statute was not intended to outlaw all 
hiring hall arrangements but only those which were operated to create a closed shop. 
S. REP. No. 1827, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-20 (1950). 
187Mountain Pac. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 
883 (1957), rev'd, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959). 
188 United Ass'n of Journeymen of Plumbing Indus., 115 N.L.R.B. 594 (1956). 
189 See, e.g., Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1629 (1958), 
rev'd, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). 
190 Mountain Pac. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 
883, 894 (1957), rev'd, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959). 
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the employer was prohibited from bargaining away.191 The Board 
thus imported into the statute a policy akin to that of the Swedish 
Employers' Federation and sought to impose as a legal rule that which 
Swedish employers had asserted and achieved by collective bargaining. 
The Board's misdirected efforts in Mountain Pacific have now 
been nullified by the Supreme Court which has made clear that the 
statute does not prohibit the employer from delegating exclusive 
control over hiring to the union."2 However, the Court has given no 
intelligible guidance for developing safeguards which will prevent 
union hiring halls from directly or indirectly depriving workers of 
their freedom to remain outside the union. 
Industries with short term employment and large numbers of em- 
ployers require some central employment agency "to eliminate wasteful, 
time consuming and repetitive scouting for jobs by individual work- 
men and haphazard uneconomical searches by employers." 193 These 
needs, however, might be met by devices other than union-operated 
hiring halls. On the Pacific Coast, the longshore and maritime indus- 
tries have set up a hiring hall administered jointly by the unions and 
the employers' association. Joint operation prevents many abuses. 
However, like the stevedore hiring halls in Sweden, the union in fact 
retains a veto power over those applying for classification as regular 
employees. It can thus block the promotion of any individual who is 
not in the good graces of the union. In New York, the state has 
operated special hiring halls for dock workers. These halls have pro- 
vided rational hiring procedures and curbed many abuses. In some 
other industries, uch as the garment trades in which union hiring halls 
once prevailed, the parties have come to rely on the government em- 
ployment offices for channelling workers to jobs. In Sweden, the gov- 
ernment employment offices have proven quite adequate for rationaliz- 
ing employment in construction, trucking, and maritime industries, 
which are even more fragmented than in this country. This alternative 
to the union hiring hall in these industries has never been seriously 
tested here. The unions are understandably reluctant; the employers 
are less understandably passive; and the Government has been 
customarily lethargic. 
In the railroad industry, the union security issue has formed a 
distinctive pattern. The Railway Labor Act of 1934 adopted the 
policy of complete freedom of choice for employees to join or not to 
191 As indicated above, there were traces in the legislative history of a desire 
to protect the employer's prerogative in the initial hiring of employees. See note 
187 supra and accompanying text. 
192 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). 
193 S. REP. No. 1827, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). 
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join a union.194 Arguments for allowing the union shop lacked urgency, 
for only one union had such agreements. Furthermore, it was feared 
that employers would use such agreements to entrench company con- 
trolled unions and freeze out "standard" unions.195 As company unions 
disappeared and standard unions became firmly established, demands 
for allowing the union shop increased. Finally, in 1951, the act was 
amended to permit union security agreements similar to those permitted 
by Taft-Hartley, but with one unique variation. An employee in the 
operating crafts could comply with the union shop agreement of one 
union by holding membership in another operating craft union.196 This 
provision, apparently allowing employees to choose between unions, did 
not reflect any concern for freedom of association, but was devised by 
the established unions to protect their institutional interests. Operating 
unions were organized on a craft basis, but the line of promotion and 
seniority rights cut across craft lines. As employment expands or 
contracts, employees shuttle from the jurisdiction of one union to 
another. To require employees to shift their union membership would 
disrupt the various insurance and benefit schemes which were substan- 
tial in these unions; to require double membership would be unduly 
burdensome.'97 The solution was strikingly similar to the Swedish pat- 
tern, but for entirely different reasons. 
Competing unions on the railroads received no protection under 
the Railway Labor Act. Employees who joined the newly-formed 
United Railroad Operating Crafts (UROC), a multiple-craft union, 
were discharged under union shop agreements of the established craft 
unions, and these discharges were upheld by the courts.198 Said the 
Supreme Court, "The aim of the Section, which was drafted by the 
established unions themselves, quite evidently was not to benefit rising 
new unions," 199 nor was its purpose "to allow employees to choose 
between unions." 200 Rather it was to protect "a group of unions 
19448 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. ? 151(a) (1958). The statute provided that 
"no carrier . . . shall require any person seeking employment to sign any contract 
or agreement promising to join or not to join a labor organization." 48 Stat. 1188 
(1934), 45 U.S.C. ?152 (5th) (1958). The intention to forbid all forms of union 
security was reasonably clear. 40 OPS. ATTY. GEN. 254 (1942). 
195 See TONER, THE CLOSED SHOP 110-13 (1942). 
19 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. ? 152 (1lth) (1958). 
197 See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rychlik, 352 U.S. 480 (1957). 
198 See Rose, The Railway Labor Act and the Jurisdiction of the Courts, 8 
LAB. L.J. 9 (1957). At least 144 members of UROC lost their jobs and were never 
reinstated. Horton & Steele, The Unity Issue Among Railroad Engineers, 10 IND. 
& LAB. L. REV. 48, 68 (1956). 
199 Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rychlik, 352 U.S. 480, 492-93 (1957). 
200 Id. at 492-93 n.29. 
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already defined and constituted" 201 and the effect was to confirm the 
established unions' control. 
The railroad shop provision serves to underscore the inherent 
difficulty of providing legal protection for the individual's freedom 
of choice within a collective bargaining structure. As both Swedish 
and American experience testifies, the collective parties-union and 
management-are not reliable guardians of individual rights. 
The individual may at most be an incidental beneficiary of the 
employer's assertion of prerogative, as in the case of SAF's section 23 
rejection of organization clauses. Protection of individual rights 
must come from outside the collective structure; it must be imposed 
by law. If the collective parties have the political strength to shape 
the law, or are permitted to write their own legislation, then in- 
dividual rights will be subordinated to collective institutional interests. 
If individual rights are adjudicated in tribunals in which the collective 
parties have an effective voice, then those rights stand in jeopardy. 
Even neutral parties constantly engaged in adjusting collective inter- 
ests may come to share the collective parties' sense of values. When 
the collective interests are compelling, as in the hiring hall situation, 
the law may simply be flaunted unless it is armed with adequate tools 
to reshape the collective structure. 
III. GENERALIZATIONS 
The problem of making meaningful comparisons is compounded 
when we attempt to draw generalizations. Though we try to view 
specific legal rules in their social context, we can still focus on but a 
small segment of legal and social institutions-here freedom of asso- 
ciation in collective labor relations. A broader perspective might re- 
veal the distortions of our narrow vision, and to reach for larger 
generalizations may multiply these distortions. In spite of these 
dangers, it may be helpful to seek to draw from the material presented 
some unifying strands which can give added meaning to the details 
and deeper insight into the underlying problem. 
It is apparent that in collective labor relations freedom of associa- 
tion has quite different content in Sweden and in the United States. 
In Sweden it is the right to organize; it does not include the right to 
reject collective action. In legal theory the individual has the right to 
choose his bargaining representative, but in fact it is designated by 
the employers' association. Most workers can choose which, if any, 
union they vill join and support, but the individual is in fact governed 
201 Id. at 495-96. 
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by the collective agreement of the LO or TCO union regardless of his 
choice. In the United States, freedom of association includes the 
right to organize, the right to choose between unions, and the right to 
reject collective action. These are balanced against each other by the 
principle of majority rule applied in fragmented bargaining units, and 
the individual may be compelled to support financially the majority 
union. These three rights are also subject to practical limitations such 
as employer hostility and unavailability of competing unions, but they 
still have a substantial measure of reality. In broadest terms, freedom 
of association in Sweden means full protection of the right to organize; 
in the United States it means limited protection of free choice. 
Implicit in the difference in the content of freedom of association 
are basically different conceptions of the role of collective bargaining 
in a democratic society. Sweden is unequivocally committed to col- 
lective bargaining as the primary instrument for regulating the labor 
market. Unions and employers' associations are viewed as the most 
appropriate institutions, not only to establish rules regulating the em- 
ployment relation, but also to help develop and implement national 
economic policies as to wage and price levels, growth rate productivity, 
and full employment. The thrust of the law, and the pressure of social 
forces, is to develop organizations on each side capable of fulfilling this 
governmental function-secure, unified, and inclusive organizations 
whose legislation by contract can impose order on the labor market. 
Collective bargaining is thus viewed in Sweden as a fundamental in- 
strument of democratic government, and the organizations tend to 
acquire a stature comparable to that of institutions of government. The 
individual who rejects collective bargaining tends to be viewed as one 
who repudiates government and who denies his responsibility as a 
citizen. Competing unions tend to be viewed as rivals to the estab- 
lished government. 
In contrast, the United States lacks any consensus that collective 
bargaining is an essential element of democratic government. Although 
this role of collective bargaining was one of the central premises of the 
Wagner Act of 1935, and that statute declared the national policy of 
"encouraging the practices and procedures of collective bargaining," 
the commitment was a limited one. Groups of workers could vote to 
reject the collective process. In the Taft-Hartley Act, this commitment 
became even more equivocal. To the right to join unions and engage 
in collective action was added in equivalent terms "the right to refrain 
from any or all such activities," and the use of economic pressure by 
either union or employer to extend collective bargaining was circum- 
scribed. The central focus was protecting employees' freedom of 
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choice; whether they chose collective bargaining was of little concern. 
Although the Landrum-Griffin amendments treat unions as having 
governmental characteristics, and impose democratic processes on them, 
there is no added commitment tocollective bargaining as an instrument 
of democratic government. On the contrary, those amendments rein- 
forced freedom of choice by added restrictions on boycotts and picketing. 
The dominant attitude of the law and society toward collective bar- 
gaining seems to be one of neutrality, if not indifference. 
The different directions Swedish and American law have taken in 
defining freedom of association in collective labor relations have even 
deeper roots. Large voluntary associations or folk movements have 
historically played a greater role in Sweden than in the United States. 
They were one of the major factors in democratizing Swedish society 
in the last half of the 19th century, and during the present century 
private organizations have exercised substantial regulatory powers in 
agriculture, commerce, industry, and other areas. This sharing in gov- 
ernmental power by organizations is considered an essential element 
in the democratic process. Unlike the situation in the United States, 
open delegations of government power to private groups is not only 
permitted but preferred. Out of this has grown a common feeling that 
individuals ought to join together to promote their common interests, 
and that there is a social obligation on the individual to support those 
organizations formed for his benefit. When the law fails to recognize 
the right not to join, it mirrors the attitude that the individual ought 
not remain outside this part of the democratic process. In the United 
States, private power, particularly collective power, has been suspect, 
and organizations have been feared as distorters of the democratic 
process. Although private groups in fact wield regulatory-type power, 
it has been less by the design of conscious social policy than by default, 
and the independence of the individual remains a primary symbolic 
value. 
It must be emphasized that the purpose of this Article has not been 
to weigh the relative merits of the two systems of labor relations or to 
provide any final answers. Rather the purpose has been to probe the 
complex and stubborn problem which both countries confront-accom- 
modating the rights of the individual within a collective labor system. 
Comparison clarifies special problems posed by each system and par- 
ticular points to which further inquiry might be directed. Thus, from 
the Swedish side, recognition of the dominant unions' control makes 
clear that if the individual is to have any role within the collective 
structure, it must be found in his participation in the governmental 
processes of the union. This emphasizes the importance of vital demo- 
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cratic processes within the union which returns to the individual a 
measure of self-determination. From the United States' side, recogni- 
tion that freedom of choice is dependent on the size of the bargaining 
unit might suggest that we reexamine the consequences of bargaining 
units which fly in the face of economic realities and in effect frustrate 
freedom of choice. Added awareness that employees in one enterprise, 
by rejecting collective bargaining, may effectively deny it to employees 
in competing enterprises, could guide us in designing larger bargaining 
units which give employees more meaningful freedom of choice. These 
are but samples which suggest the possible radiations of the comparative 
study and its function as an intermediate range of inquiry. 
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